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ABSTRACT 
 
Organizations commonly use teams to rapidly and appropriately respond to crises. These 
teams must face a multidimensional challenge because crises not only present sets of ill-defined, 
complex problems, but also exert high emotional demands on the team. As a result, effective 
team functioning in crisis events involves handling each dimension of the crisis through distinct, 
yet concurrent, types of responses, namely team cognitive processes and collective emotions. 
Research on groups also suggests that cognitive processes and collective emotions are 
dynamically intertwined and can influence one another. Studies of crisis events to date, however, 
have largely examined cognition and emotion in isolation from one another. As a result, we 
know little about how team cognitive processes and collective emotions go hand in hand over the 
course a crisis event to shape team performance. This study seeks to address this research gap. 
Focusing on 20 teams of MBA students dealing with a simulated organizational crisis, I used a 
longitudinal research design and behavioural observation methods to examine the dynamics of 
the interplay between team cognitive processes and collective emotions at two different temporal 
scales.  
At the micro-temporal scale, I examined the co-occurrence (also called coupling) of team 
cognitive processes and collective emotions to determine which observed couplings were 
statistically meaningful in higher- versus lower-performing teams facing a crisis event. Lag 
sequential analyses revealed that compared with lower-performing teams, higher-performing 
teams were less likely to engage in explicit situation processing in an emotionally-midaroused 
team atmosphere. Higher-performing teams were also less likely than lower-performing teams to 
exhibit implicit situation processing in an emotionally-neutral team atmosphere. Lower-
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performing teams, on the other hand, had more tendency to engage in implicit situation 
processing in an emotionally-homogeneous team atmosphere. Finally, lower-performing teams 
were more likely than higher-performing teams to exhibit implicit action processing in an 
emotionally-midaroused team atmosphere. 
At the macro-temporal scale, I tracked the evolution of couplings over the course of the 
crisis event by means of an exploratory visualization tool called GridWare. GridWare enabled 
me to characterize and compare the structure and the content of the coupling trajectory of higher- 
and lower-performing teams. The coupling trajectory of higher performers was not found to be 
any more or less variable than that of lower performers. However, according to my analyses, the 
coupling trajectory of higher-performing teams was significantly more likely to become 
absorbed in a single, strong, attracting coupling, as opposed to the coupling trajectory of lower-
performing teams which tended to get drawn toward multiple, weaker, attracting couplings. The 
single, strong attracting coupling that pulled the trajectory of higher-performing teams was the 
coupling of explicit action processing and midaroused-neutral collective emotions. This indicates 
that higher performers had more tendency to keep returning to discussing and updating their 
decisions/actions in a midaroused-neutral emotional atmosphere. Theoretical contributions of 
this study and implications of these findings for practice and for future research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Crises are becoming increasingly frequent in a wide array of businesses and organizations 
(James, Wooten, & Dushek, 2011; Kalavar & Mysore, 2017; Waller & Roberts, 2003), ranging 
from life-threatening events such as airplane malfunctions and nuclear plant near-meltdowns to 
major organizational crises such as large-scale product recalls, labour strikes, and financial 
scandals. A crisis event –or, more simply called a crisis– is defined as a certain form of extreme 
event that has four main characteristics: (1) the event has a low probability of occurring but, 
nevertheless, poses a huge threat to the viability of the organization, (2) the event takes place 
unexpectedly, (3) there is little or no response time available, and (4) there is ambiguity in terms 
of the cause, exact effect, or means of resolution of the threat (Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, & 
Cavarretta, 2009; Hermann, 1963; Pearson & Clair, 1998). Although crises may vary in their 
degree of extremity (Hannah et al., 2009), two conclusions about every crisis event are beyond 
question: 1) it always poses a major threat to system survival and are often hugely consequential 
to organizational members and communities in terms of loss and damage (e.g., psychological, 
environmental, financial, material, organizational reputation, human life and livelihood, etc.), 
and 2) it typically requires team1 effort to quickly fashion an appropriate response (King, 2002; 
Waller & Kaplan, 2018).  
Accordingly, researchers in fields such as organizational behaviour, communication 
studies, and psychology have taken an interest in the study of teams facing crises in order to 
understand how those teams effectively respond to crisis events. One line of research that has 
                                                     
1 Throughout this manuscript, and reflecting much of the existing literature, I use the terms “group” and “team” 
interchangeably to refer to “interdependent collections of individuals who share responsibility for specific outcomes 
for their organizations” (Sundstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, l990, p. 120). 
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recently received increasing attention among scholars is focused on the behavioural aspects of 
team functioning during a crisis. Work in this area suggests that the effectiveness of a team’s 
response to a crisis is largely dependent upon members’ behavioural actions and interactions 
throughout the crisis – particularly from crisis inception until the acute stage2 of the crisis passes. 
In other words, investigating real-time behaviours and interactions of team members during a 
crisis event can provide new insights into the factors distinguishing higher-performing teams 
from lower-performing ones in the time of crisis (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Kolbe et 
al., 2014; Waller, 1999). 
A great deal of work on team functioning during a crisis has focused on the role of team 
information-processing behaviours, also known as team cognitive processes. Team cognitive 
processes are members’ interdependent acts of accumulation, exchange, evaluation and use of 
information for generating decisions and actions (Fiore & Salas, 2004; Gibson, 2001; Gibson & 
Earley, 2007). Given that crises are, by definition, associated with ambiguity and ill-defined 
problems (i.e., the fourth characteristic of a crisis event, as defined earlier), teams need to 
employ cognitive processes to make sense of the novel situation before generating effective 
responses. Empirical research has established a strong link between team performance during a 
crisis and different forms of cognitive processes such as explicit cognitive processes which 
involve overt communications (e.g., speaking up; see Edmondson, 2003), implicit cognitive 
processes that are employed without the need for overt communications (e.g., team member 
monitoring; see Marks & Panzer, 2004), cognitive processes focused on understanding the 
                                                     
2 An organizational crisis moves from the pre-crisis to the acute stage when it becomes visible outside the 
organization. At this point in time, the crisis requires urgent attention and immediate action. When the acute stage of 
the crisis occurs, the crisis management team has no choice but to address the crisis. It is too late to take preventative 
actions and any action taken now is more associated with damage control (Fink, 1986; Kash & Darling, 1998). 
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situation (e.g., information collection and transfer; see Waller, 1999), and those concerning 
decisions and actions (e.g., task distribution; see Schmutz, Hoffmann, Heimberg, & Manser, 
2015). Overall, this stream of work suggests that there are important differences in team 
cognitive processes exhibited by higher- versus lower-performing teams in the time of crisis. 
A second, considerably smaller set of studies on team functioning during a crisis has 
examined the effect of emotions that emerge in the time of crisis. Emotions are a collective 
property of work groups (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Rhee, 2007); They are embedded in team 
members’ interactions and reactions to events (Knight, 2009; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), 
manifest themselves behaviourally and spread among team members to constitute team-level 
collective emotion3 (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Kelly & Barsade, 2001). Acknowledging the 
significance of the emotional aspect of crises (James et al., 2011; Kaplan, LaPort, & Waller, 
2013; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004), studies have shown how 
team performance in crisis events varies as a function of positive or negative emotions emerged 
within the team (e.g., Hunziker et al., 2011; Kaplan et al., 2013). The arousal dimension of 
emotion has also been found to affect the capacity of the team for rapid and effective response 
(e.g., Gump & Kulik, 1997; Quinn & Dutton, 2005). Altogether, this body of research suggests 
that team-level collective emotions are an important factor in distinguishing higher- from lower-
performing teams during crisis events. 
 
                                                     
3 I use the terms “affect” and “emotion” interchangeably in this work, considering them as semantically similar 
terms that encompass the general phenomenon of subjective feelings (see also Barsade, 2002; Barsade & Gibson, 
1998).  
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Towards an Integration 
As stated above, there are two main streams of research on team functioning during a 
crisis: one stream of research highlights team cognitive processes as a significant predictor of 
team performance during a crisis, while the other suggests that collective emotions have a highly 
consequential impact on team performance in the time of crisis. Largely missing from work in 
this area is integration between the two streams of research. For one thing, research on teams 
facing crisis events has rarely included both cognitive processes and collective emotions as 
predictors of team effectiveness during the crisis. The relationship between the two constructs 
has received even less attention by researchers, which has resulted in a dearth of cumulative 
knowledge regarding the effect of the interplay between team cognitive processes and collective 
emotions during a crisis (Barsade & Knight, 2015). Even those few research studies that have 
included both a cognitive process construct and an emotional construct in their investigations of 
teams facing crises offer inconsistent suggestions regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the two constructs (e.g., Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015; Maitlis 
& Sonenshein, 2010). These inconsistencies might be due to the fact that researchers have tended 
to discount the dynamic character of cognitive processes and collective emotions (Collins, 
Lawrence, Troth, & Jordan, 2013; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; 
McGrath, 1984) and taken a static approach when capturing these constructs and, by extension, 
examining their interplay. In order to address this gap, a longitudinal research design is required 
in which each type of construct is measured at multiple points in time and the possibility of 
mutual influence can be properly examined. By simultaneously capturing the evolution of team 
cognitive processes and of collective emotions during a crisis event, researchers can capture the 
dynamics of the interplay between the two constructs over the course of the crisis. It is to this 
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end that my study was aimed. Seeking to advance our understanding of how teams respond 
simultaneously to the cognitive and emotional aspects of a crisis over time, I specifically focused 
on the co-occurrences (also called couplings) of team cognitive processes and collective 
emotions and analyzed the dynamics of their couplings at two different temporal scales: micro-
temporal and macro-temporal. The following exploratory research questions guided this 
endeavour:  
1) How do micro-temporal couplings of team cognitive processes and collective 
emotions displayed during the crisis distinguish higher-performing from lower-
performing teams? 
2) How do higher-performing teams and lower-performing teams differ in their trajectory 
of the coupling between team cognitive processes and collective emotions over the 
timespan of a crisis event? 
 
Boundary Conditions  
There are three important boundary conditions for the present study. First, the proposed 
study considers organizational crises as a proper setting for investigating its research questions, 
because crises tend to trigger a variety of cognitive processes (Kolbe et al., 2013; 2014) and 
make more visible a wide spectrum of emotional reactions among team members (e.g., Barnett & 
Pratt, 2000; James et al., 2011). This allows for capturing a potentially higher degree of variation 
in the interplay between team cognitive processes and collective emotions over time. My study 
does not intend to extend theory and research on the conceptualization and delineation of crisis 
events. Exploring the causes and/or effects of variability in the four main characteristics of a 
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crisis (i.e., consequentiality, unpredictability, time pressure, and uncertainty) is also outside the 
scope of this research. Rather, the present study focuses on one type of crisis event in which the 
dynamics of the interplay between team cognitive processes and collective emotions can be 
“transparently observable” (Pettigrew, 1990). In order to capture the main constructs of this 
study (i.e., team cognitive processes, collective emotions, and their coupling) in the context of 
crises, I particularly drew on the literature on teams facing crisis events and also tapped into 
insights from the larger literature on groups. In order to assess team performance during a crisis, 
I mostly consulted literature on crisis management. 
Second, this research focuses on a specific type of crisis management teams, called dual-
purpose action teams (Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2013). Dual-purpose action teams spend the 
majority of their time together completing routine tasks; however, upon recognition of a crisis 
event, the team is expected to immediately abandon routine tasks and effectively respond to the 
crisis. Examples of these teams include aviation flight crews, nuclear plant control room crews, 
sports teams, and theatre stage management teams. In the context of corporate crises, crisis 
management teams can also be characterized as dual-purpose action teams. Typically composed 
of top executives and individuals in senior management positions (Sayegh et al., 2004; Waller, 
Lei, & Pratten, 2014), members of crisis management teams have a history of working together 
prior to the crisis as they would regularly attend top management meetings to make joint 
decisions on how to improve their organization’s performance. When faced with a crisis event, 
these top executives and senior managers quickly form into a crisis management team tasked 
with minimizing the immediate and long-term impacts of the crisis on the organization and its 
stakeholders. In contrast to dual-purpose action teams, single-purpose action teams are 
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specifically trained to work together under tremendous time pressure to address potentially 
catastrophic extreme events (King, 2002; Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2013). Medical emergency 
teams, firefighting teams, and search-and-rescue teams are examples of this type of teams. Given 
the majority of teamwork in single-purpose action teams is focused on waiting for or responding 
to a crisis event, these teams may be more equipped than dual-purpose action teams to deal with 
some of the challenging aspects of the crisis (e.g., time pressure, uncertainty, and 
consequentiality). As a result, the cognitive and emotional dynamics of a single-purpose action 
team may look quite different from those of a dual-purpose action team.  
The third boundary condition of this study concerns the time frame within which crisis 
management teams respond to a crisis event. Similar to past research on team functioning in the 
time of crisis (e.g., Kaplan et al., 2013; Kolbe et al., 2014; Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009), 
my study investigates the behavioural actions and interactions of crisis management teams 
during the initial, and often most distressing, time of a crisis. More specifically, the current 
research aims to capture the dynamics of the interplay between team cognitive processes and 
collective emotions from crisis inception until the acute stage of the crisis passes, which lasts 
only up to a few hours for the majority of dual-purpose action teams. Therefore, the findings of 
this work seem most relevant to those crisis management teams that are dealing with shorter-
term crises or with the initial period of prolonged crises (Coultas, Driskell, Burke, & Salas, 2014; 
Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008).  
In the following chapter, I provide an overview of key insights from the literature on 
team functioning during a crisis, particularly pertaining to team cognitive processes, collective 
emotions and their interplay. I then fully describe the research gap that the current study intends 
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to address through capturing the dynamics of the interplay between cognitive processes and 
collective emotions in teams dealing with a crisis. In Chapter 3, I explain my research design and 
discuss the method that I employed to collect, code and analyze data in order to answer my 
research questions. Chapter 4 summarizes the results of my analyses. In Chapter 5, I discuss the 
results of the study in detail. I conclude by outlining theoretical and practical implications, 
reflecting on the limitations of my work and exploring areas for future research.   
  
  
9 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Team Cognitive Processes During Crisis Events 
A large body of research on teams facing crisis events has taken a cognitive approach to 
assessing team functioning during a crisis. This approach is based on viewing teams as collective 
information-processing units (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997) and, thus, depicting team 
cognitive processes as central drivers of team performance during a crisis. Crises are, as defined 
earlier, a major organizational threat that is ambiguous in terms of the cause, exact effect, or 
means of resolution (Pearson & Clair, 1998). They have been rightly called “wicked problems” 
(Stubbart, 1987), because they present a high level of uncertainty and cognitive complexity 
(Hannah et al., 2009). As a result, teams facing a crisis event need to engage in systematic and 
deliberate processing of information (i.e., team cognitive processes) to be able to make sense of 
these ill-defined situations and generate effective responses (Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2008; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Empirical evidence has supported this assertion by establishing a 
variety of team cognitive processes as significant predictors of team performance in high-stress 
and crisis-like events (Salas, Rosen, Burke, Nicholson, & Howse, 2007; Uitdewilligen, 2011).  
Synthesizing the broad conceptualization of team processes (Marks et al., 2001) with 
narrower descriptions of team cognitive processes that currently exist in groups research 
literature (Fiore & Salas, 2004; Gibson, 2001; Hinsz et al., 1997), I use team cognitive processes 
as an umbrella term that encompasses specific forms of information processing behaviours4 
                                                     
4 A behaviour refers to an overt action or reaction, as opposed to one’s inner thoughts and feelings. Behaviours can 
be readily observed and takes the form of verbal utterances, written statements or nonverbal displays such as facial 
expressions, vocalizations, postures, and bodily movements (Breckler, 1984; Kozlowski, 2015). Behaviours are at 
the centre of team processes, which is why they are sometimes called “team behavioural processes” (DeChurch & 
Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). Team process involves members' interacting with other members and with their task 
environment (Marks et al. 2001), and team members often rely on one or more forms of behaviour for expressing 
these interactions (Kozlowski, 2015). 
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exhibited by team members. More specifically, I define team cognitive processes as members’ 
interdependent acts of gathering, exchanging, interpreting, and using information directed toward 
generating decisions and actions in order to achieve collective goals (Fiore & Salas, 2004; 
Gibson, 2001; Gibson & Earley, 2007). Research suggests that most teams enact all these 
cognitive processes to some degree during their lifetime. However, time spent on each of these 
processes may vary across teams, and teams move back and forth between cognitive processes 
depending on the task, the dynamics of the team, and the context in which they are embedded 
(Corner, Kinicki, & Keats, 1994; Gibson, 2001). As a team-level construct5, team cognitive 
processes emerge among the minds of team members and can therefore be located in members’ 
verbal and nonverbal behaviours and interactions within the team space (Cooke, Gorman, & 
Kiekel, 2008; Kennedy & McComb, 2010). In other words, team cognitive processes take an 
ostensive form (Waller, Okhuysen, & Saghafian, 2016) – that is, they can be recognized by team 
members as well as outside observers (Marks et al., 2001; Salas et al., 2007).  
Team cognitive processes are generally considered a key factor that distinguishes higher-
performing teams from lower-performing ones in the time of crisis. However, research has 
identified some cognitive processes to be more effective than others in crisis events. These 
cognitive processes include a wide spectrum of behavioural processes, ranging from information 
                                                     
5 There are two separate, but interrelated, theoretical perspectives on team cognition (Fiore & Salas, 2004). One 
perspective conceptualizes the team cognition construct as any behavioural process that involves processing of 
information (see Cooke, Gorman, Myers, and Duran (2013) as well as Gibson (2001) for a review). The other 
perspective characterizes team cognition as a collective knowledge representation emerging as a result of those team 
processes (see DeChurch and Mesmer-Magnus (2010) as well as Uitdewilligen, Waller, and Zijlstra (2010) for a 
review). From the former perspective, team cognitive processes (e.g., gathering, exchanging, interpreting, and using 
information) can represent team cognition, whereas the latter perspective uses emergent cognitive states (e.g., shared 
mental models, transactive memory, team situation awareness) to describe team cognition. Given I am interested in 
the behavioural aspects of team functioning during a crisis, I approach the team cognition construct from the former 
perspective. 
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request and planning to team monitoring and talking to the room. Such diversity, if left 
unorganized, may present a challenge to the comparison and integration of research findings 
regarding the effect of team cognitive processes on the effectiveness of teams facing a crisis. 
Kolbe and her colleagues (Kolbe et al., 2009, 2011, 2013; Manser et al., 2008) developed a 
useful framework to organize cognitive processes that are most relevant to team functioning 
during a crisis6. This framework has been continually refined and improved via a series of 
theoretical and empirical research studies, with a particular focus on action teams in high-risk 
healthcare settings. The most refined version of this framework (Kolbe et al., 2013) categorizes 
cognitive processes along two distinct dimensions: 1) the mode of information processing, and 2) 
the type of information being processed.   
The first dimension of Kolbe and colleagues’ (2013) framework captures whether 
information processing is enacted in an explicit or implicit mode. A certain cognitive process is 
characterized as explicit when it involves team members overtly exchanging information, 
interpretation and decision/action (Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & 
Gibson, 2008). Explicit cognitive processes are typically expressed when team members are 
engaged in reciprocal interactions and, therefore, include requesting information from another 
team member, responding to another member’s request for information, reacting to the 
comments or actions of a certain team member, and suggesting a new course of action with an 
expectation for an overt reaction from other team members (Kolbe et al., 2013). Examples of 
                                                     
6 Although Kolbe and her colleagues call this classification a “framework of coordination behaviour”, their 
framework captures team cognitive processes more than coordination; All 12 behaviours in the framework fit the 
description of a team cognitive process (see the previous page for the definition). Moreover, the authors did not 
present a clear definition for coordination. Rather, they seem to use the term “coordination” loosely to represent 
team processes that are most relevant to crisis-like events. 
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explicit cognitive processes are task prioritization (e.g., Waller 1999; Waller, Gupta, & 
Giambatista, 2004), explicit reasoning (e.g., Tschan et al., 2009), and speaking up (e.g., 
Edmondson, 2003). Explicit information processing facilitates elaborate collective sensemaking 
and back-and-forth discussion about solutions required when dealing with novelty and 
uncertainty associated with crisis events (Rico et al., 2008; Tschan, Semmer, Hunziker, & 
Marsch, 2011). When team members are engaged in explicit cognitive processes, the team is 
more likely to avoid groupthink (Janis, 1982, 1989) and, thus, negate some of the threat-rigidity 
effects (Staw et al., 1981).  
An implicit cognitive process, in contrast, is employed without the need for overt 
reciprocal interactions between team members (Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Wittenbaum, Stasser, & 
Merry, 1996). Team members use implicit mode of cognitive processes based on their tacit 
anticipation of task demands or their teammates’ actions and needs (Rico et al., 2008). Such 
anticipation enables them to initiate one-way communication in which they either offer 
information to other team members without request or gather information without any explicit 
instruction (Kolbe et al., 2013). Examples of implicit cognitive processes include team member 
monitoring (e.g., Kolbe et al., 2014; Marks & Panzer, 2004), talking to the room (e.g., Waller & 
Uitdewilligen, 2008), and providing information without request (e.g., Schmutz et al., 2015). 
Implicit cognitive processes may be particularly effective under high time pressure (e.g., during a 
crisis) when teams do not have the luxury of prolonged conversation and, yet, there is an urgent 
need for the synchronization of members’ activities (Smith-Jentsch, Kraiger, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Salas, 2009).  
The second dimension of Kolbe and colleagues’ (2013) framework revolves around the 
  
13 
 
type of information being processed. In line with past research on team interactions and team 
decision development (Gibson, 2001; Poole & Roth, 1989; Sohrab, 2014), work on team 
functioning during a crisis distinguishes between team cognitive processes focused on 
understanding the situation and those concerning decisions and actions (Burtscher, Wacker, 
Grote, & Manser, 2010; Schmutz et al., 2015). Situation-focused cognitive processes refer to 
members’ acts of gathering, exchanging, or interpreting facts and ideas related to various aspects 
of the situation at hand (e.g., problem features, environmental conditions, resources, timeline, 
etc.). Examples of situation-focused cognitive processes are information collection and transfer 
(Waller, 1999), systems monitoring (e.g., Burtscher, Kolbe, Wacker, & Manser, 2011) and 
information allocation (e.g., Ellis, 2006; Ellis & Pearsall, 2011). These processes enable teams to 
recognize potential problems in the environment and identify the underlying cause of an ongoing 
problem (Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006; Poole & Roth, 1989; Waller, 1999). In 
other words, they facilitate sensemaking at the team level (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010) and help 
create and update the team’s shared understanding of the situation and the problem (Kolbe et al. 
2013; Salas et al., 2007; Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2008).  
Action-focused cognitive processes, on the other hand, involve gathering, exchanging, or 
applying facts and ideas regarding the team’s decisions or members’ actions. When teams enact 
action-focused processes during a crisis, they draw on their understanding of the situation to 
(re)formulate decisions on joint actions or coordinate individual actions among themselves 
(Gibson, 2001; Kolbe et al., 2013; Uitdewilligen, 2011). As a result, action-focused processes 
include sharing ideas on a decision, assigning tasks among team members, commenting on one’s 
own actions, monitoring the actions of other team members, and providing suggestive or 
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corrective feedback on the actions of other team members (Kolbe et al. 2013; Marks et al., 2001). 
Examples of action-focused cognitive processes include task distribution (e.g., Schmutz et al. 
2015; Waller, 1999; Waller et al., 2004), planning (e.g., Manser, Harrison, Gaba, & Howard, 
2009), and team member monitoring (e.g., Kolbe et al., 2014; Marks & Panzer, 2004). The 
importance of action-focused processes increases as the crisis unfolds and the team faces 
growing time pressure to shift from environment-probing processes to activities leading directly 
to crisis resolution (Schraagen, Veld, & De Koning, 2010; Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005).  
Crossing implicit/explicit cognitive processes with situation-focused/action-focused 
cognitive processes yields four meaningful categories of team cognitive processes in Kolbe and 
colleagues’ (2013) framework (see Table 1). This organizing framework provides an apparatus 
for differentiating between various cognitive processes based on their mode of information 
processing and the type of information being processed. Drawing on Kolbe and colleagues as 
well as other work reviewed above, I define and refer to these four categories as follows. Explicit 
situation processing includes overt, reciprocal interactions between team members aimed at 
enhancing their shared understanding of the situation and the problem. Implicit situation 
processing captures members’ unsolicited communication of or unrequested collection of 
information regarding the situation and the problem, driven by their anticipation of other team 
members’ needs and task demands. Explicit action processing includes overt, reciprocal 
interactions about the team’s decisions or members’ actions that aims at generating the best 
solution to the problem and facilitating action coordination. Implicit action processing 
encompasses members’ unsolicited communication of or unrequested collection of information 
about decisions/actions, driven by their anticipation of other members’ needs/actions and task 
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demands, in order to facilitate action coordination in the team7. Each of these four categories of 
cognitive processes captures a distinct aspect of a team’s cognitive response to a crisis. Does this 
imply that each category needs to go hand in hand with a different collective emotion to become 
more (or less) effective in teams facing a crisis event? My research seeks to answer this question.  
 
  
                                                     
7 Implicit action processing closely resembles the concept of “tacit coordination” or “implicit coordination” 
previously introduced to groups literature (Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Rico et al., 2008; Wittenbaum et al., 1996). 
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Table 1. Categories of team cognitive process that are most relevant to team functioning during a crisis 
 
 
Situation-focused Action-focused 
 
Explicit  
 
Explicit situation processing 
Examples: 
• Information collection (Waller et al., 2004) 
•  Retrieval coordination (Ellis, 2006) 
•  Explicit reasoning (Tschan et al., 2009) 
•  Use of knowledge tools (Uitdewilligen, 2011)  
 
 
Explicit action processing 
Examples: 
•  Task prioritization (Waller, 1999; Waller et al., 
2004) 
•  Task distribution (Schmutz et al. 2015; Waller, 
1999; Waller et al., 2004) 
•  Planning (Manser et al., 2008, 2009) 
•  Structuring behaviours (Uitdewilligen, 2011) 
•  Instruction (Kolbe et al., 2014) 
•  Speaking up (Edmondson, 2003) 
 
Implicit  
 
Implicit situation processing 
Examples:  
•  Provide information without request (Schmutz et 
al. 2015) 
•  Information allocation (Ellis, 2006; Ellis & 
Pearsall, 2011) 
•  Talking to the room (situation-focused) (Kolbe 
et al., 2014; Tschan et al., 2009; Waller & 
Uitdewilligen, 2008) 
•  Systems monitoring (Burtscher et al., 2011) 
•  Gather information (Kolbe et al., 2014) 
 
Implicit action processing 
Examples: 
•  Team member monitoring (Burtscher et al. 2011; 
Marks & Panzer, 2004)  
•  Talking to the room (action-focused) (Kolbe et 
al., 2014) 
•  Provide assistance (Kolbe et al., 2014) 
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Collective Emotions During Crisis Events 
Handling a crisis is an emotional time for teams. The defining characteristics of crises 
(i.e., consequentiality, unpredictability, time pressure, and uncertainty) tend to elicit particular 
emotional experiences in team members including surprise, despair, guilt, stress, fear, or anger. 
Effective handling of the crisis also demands that team members display certain emotional 
reactions including attentiveness, calmness, or sometimes excitement (Barnett & Pratt, 2000; 
James et al., 2011; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Sayegh et al., 2004). The combination of these 
emotions within the team contributes to the development of team-level collective emotion 
(Barsade & Gibson, 1998). Collective emotions can enhance or hamper the capacity of the team 
for rapid and effective response. For example, collective emotions can broaden or narrow the 
team’s breadth of attention and actions, increase or decrease social integration and affiliation, 
and facilitate or impede the effort devoted to coordinated activities (e.g., Fredrickson, Tugade, 
Waugh, & Larkin, 2003; Gump & Kulik, 1997; Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015; Quinn & Dutton, 
2005). Consequently, collective emotions can play a large part in ultimate team effectiveness 
during a crisis. Although there has been limited empirical work on collective emotions during a 
crisis event, several studies have demonstrated the significant effect of collective emotions that 
emerge in the time of crisis on team performance (e.g., Drach-Zahavy & Freund, 2007; Hunziker 
et al., 2011, 2012; Kaplan et al., 2013). 
Drawing on the work by Barsade and her colleagues (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Barsade 
& Knight, 2015; Kelly & Barsade, 2001), I define collective emotion as a team-level affective 
state arising from a combination of members’ mutual exposure to the group’s context (e.g., 
affective norms, environmental events) and the affective experiences of team members 
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transferred within the team through one or more affective sharing processes (e.g., contagion, 
emotional comparison). Collective emotion manifests itself behaviourally through verbal 
communications as well as nonverbal behaviours such as facial expressions, vocalizations, 
postures, and movements. It can be reliably recognized by group members and outside observers 
(Barsade, 2002; Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; 
Totterdell, Kellet, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998). As a result, and much like team cognitive 
processes, collective emotions can be characterized as an ostensive emergent phenomenon 
(Waller et al., 2016). 
Scholars have long recognized emotion as a multidimensional construct. Common among 
most prominent models of emotion are two basic, orthogonal, dimensions (Larsen & Diener, 
1992; Russell, 1978; 1980). One dimension captures hedonic valence or pleasantness, ranging 
from positive (pleasant) to neutral to negative (unpleasant). The second dimension represents 
arousal or intensity, ranging from aroused to moderately aroused to unaroused. These two 
dimensions reflect a composite of hedonic valence and arousal for each specific emotion. For 
example, happiness is a positive feeling state experienced with a medium level of arousal, 
surprise is characterized by neutral valence and high arousal, and boredom is a negative low-
arousal emotion. Together, these two dimensions of emotion create the circumplex model of 
emotion (see Figure 1). This model has received strong empirical support at both physiological 
and psychological levels (Larsen & Diener, 1992; Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Russell, 
1980; Van Katwyk, Fox, Spector, & Kelloway, 2000; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Moreover, 
compared with other existing emotion models such as the Positive Activation-Negative 
Activation model (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999) and the 
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basic emotion model (Ekman, 1992), the two-dimensional circumplex model of emotion helps 
capture a much broader range of emotions, including the less studied ones. Finally, the 
circumplex model has been found to be more consistent with recent findings from behavioural, 
cognitive neuroscience, and developmental studies of emotion, compared with the basic emotion 
model (Posner et al., 2005). Although originally developed for individual-level emotion, the 
circumplex model of emotion has also been adopted as an organizing framework for classifying 
team-level collective emotions and received empirical support (e.g., Barsade 2002; Bartel & 
Saavedra, 2000; Lehmann-Willenbrock, Meyers, Kauffeld, Neininger, & Henschel, 2011).  
Collective emotion during crisis events has almost always been examined based on its 
hedonic valence – more specifically, how positive (toward pleasant) or negative (toward 
unpleasant) the collective emotion is. On the one hand, there is broad consensus that positive 
emotions are generally conducive to making better decision choices in the face of crisis (Sayegh 
et al., 2004; Sommer, Howell, & Hadley, 2016). Experiencing positive emotions during the crisis 
broadens people’s attention, thinking, and behavioural repertoires, thereby facilitating flexibility 
and creativity required to deal with ambiguities, time pressure, and limited resources associated 
with crisis events (Fredrickson et al., 2003). When positive emotions are expressed and spread 
within the team, their broadening effects can improve the quality of interactions among team 
members, enable the collection and integration of diverse information, and lead to the generation 
of novel and creative solutions to the problem at hand (Burke et al., 2006, Walter & Bruch, 
2008). Research evidence also suggests that team-level positive emotions predict higher team 
performance during a crisis event (e.g., Drach-Zahavy & Freund, 2007; Hunziker et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, there is less than unanimous agreement on the effect of team-level 
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negative emotions in teams facing crisis events. For the most part, negative emotions have been 
considered detrimental to team performance during a crisis (e.g., Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; 
Hunziker et al., 2011; Kaplan et al., 2013), mainly due to the conviction that negative emotional 
reactions tend to limit the possible ways a crisis can be resolved (Fredrickson, 2001; James et al., 
2011). Nevertheless, a recent meta-analysis indicates that team-level negative emotions can, in 
fact, enhance social integration and, ultimately, team performance when the team faces a 
common external threat (Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015). A closer examination of the trajectory of 
collective emotions during a crisis also revealed that members of higher-performing teams 
exhibit negative emotions at certain points during the acute stage of a crisis event, once at the 
start and again toward the end of the acute stage (Saghafian & Waller, 2015). Taken together, 
past research focusing on the pleasantness dimension of collective emotion supports the notion 
that the hedonic tone of collective emotions, whether toward a positive or a negative end, can 
distinguish higher- from lower-performing teams dealing with a crisis.  
The effect of team-level neutral emotion on team performance in general, and during a 
crisis in particular, has received almost no scholarly attention. Research studies often incorporate 
neutral emotions only as a baseline or a control condition to make the effects of positive or 
negative emotions more visible. The most explicit discussion on neutrality can be found in 
research on neutral display rules in some professional organizations such as law offices, medical 
units, and police departments where employees are socialized to act with “affective neutrality” 
(Smith & Kleinman, 1989; Wharton & Erickson, 1993). According to affect climate theory 
(Parke & Seo, 2017), while constant expression of neutrality within an organizational unit 
reduces the number of errors made out of carelessness or emotional biases, it also diminishes 
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creativity and members’ ability to effectively resolve new threats due to greater social distance 
among members and lower psychological safety. 
Emotional arousal at the team level refers to the intensity with which emotions are 
expressed and communicated among team members. It characterizes the salience of the 
nonverbal displays of emotion such as facial expressions, bodily movements, and vocalizations 
(Barsade, 2002; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). Research shows that emotional arousal has 
motivational effects; it influences the amount and direction of the effort that team members exert 
in their coordinated activities (e.g., Johnson, 2009; Quinn & Dutton, 2005). Moreover, when 
people face novel threat conditions, their shared experiences of emotional arousal have been 
found to promote affiliation among them (Gump & Kulik, 1997; Schachter, 1959; Townsend, 
Kim, & Mesquita 2014). A high level of emotional arousal also tends to signal the significance 
of changing circumstances in the environment and stimulate collaborative information 
processing among team members to make sense of those changes (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; 
Knight & Baer, 2014). Finally, emotional arousal may increase the vigilance needed to recognize 
potential problems in the environment and search for information (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001). 
Nevertheless, excessive emotional arousal has been linked to less systematic information 
processing, reliance on simplistic response strategies, and superficial consideration of 
environmental evidence, leading to a distorted interpretation of the situation (Lazar, 1999; 
Sayegh et al., 2004). Medium-level emotional arousal, on the other hand, consumes less 
cognitive resources and enables more adaptive sensemaking during a crisis (Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010).  
In line with previous research on team-level collective emotion, I captured the evolution 
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of collective emotion along its two basic dimensions of hedonic valence (positive, neutral, 
negative) and arousal (high, medium, low). As shown in Table 2, these two orthogonal 
dimensions can create nine categories of emotion that help capture a potentially high degree of 
variation in affective states and are, therefore, more consistent with an exploratory research 
approach8. Focusing on teams undergoing a crisis event, I used this two-dimensional framework 
to assess the degree to which teams manifest each dimension of collective emotion. This enabled 
me to provide more nuanced answers to the two research questions of this study.  
 
  
                                                     
8 During the coding process, I decided to remove three categories from and add a new category to this framework. I 
ended up using a seven-category framework to assess collective emotions in my research context. Please see Chapter 
3 for more details. 
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Figure 1. Circumplex model of emotion  
(adapted from Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell, 2003) 
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Table 2. Categories of collective emotions 
 
 Positive Valence Neutral Valence Negative Valence 
 
High 
Arousal 
 
Aroused-Positive 
 
Examples: 
•  Enthusiastic 
•  Excited  
•  Elated 
 
Aroused-Neutral 
 
Examples: 
•  Surprised 
•  Astonished 
•  Active 
•  Intense 
 
 
Aroused-Negative 
 
Examples: 
•  Anxious 
•  Fearful 
•  Stressed 
•  Angry 
•  Disgusted 
 
Medium 
Arousal 
 
Midaroused-Positive 
 
Examples: 
•  Happy 
•  Pleased 
•  Cheerful  
•  Amused 
•  Interested 
 
 
Midaroused-Neutral 
 
Examples: 
•  Focused 
•  Attentive 
•  Certain 
 
Midaroused-Negative 
 
Examples: 
•  Sad 
•  Gloomy 
•  Annoyed 
•  Disappointed 
•  Frustrated 
•  Confused 
 
Low 
Arousal 
 
Unaroused-Positive 
 
Examples: 
•  Content 
•  Relaxed 
•  At ease 
 
Unaroused-Neutral 
 
Examples: 
•  Quiet 
•  Idle 
•  Inactive 
 
Unaroused-Negative 
 
Examples: 
•  Tired 
•  Drowsy 
•  Bored 
•  Depressed 
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Interplay of Team Cognitive Processes and Collective Emotions during Crisis Events 
Cognitive approaches to team functioning have enhanced our understanding of the role 
that team cognitive processes play in teams dealing with a crisis event. Past research on 
collective emotions has also established how emotions that emerge at the team level matter in the 
time of crisis. Although both streams of research share a focus on team functioning during a 
crisis, they lack adequate integration with one another. This lack of integrative approach stands 
in stark contrast with the reality of teams undergoing a crisis, where teams not only must 
navigate through cognitive complexities and information ambiguity associated with crisis events 
(Stubbart, 1987; Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2008), but also need to work in an emotionally 
demanding atmosphere as the team is subject to conditions of time pressure and limited resources 
while under the shadow of potentially severe consequences (Kaplan et al., 2013; Pearson & 
Clair, 1998; Sayegh et al., 2004). As a result, crises may bring about a complex array of 
cognitive and emotional responses that unfold in tandem with each other and drive performance 
one way or another. Team functioning in crisis events, thus, involves two distinct, yet 
concurrent, behavioural dimensions (i.e., cognitive processes and collective emotions). This 
logic is in alignment with theoretical and empirical research on groups in general which suggests 
that cognitive processes and collective emotions are essentially interrelated and can influence 
one another (e.g., Barsade & Knight, 2015; Lehmann-Willenbrock et al., 2011; Metiu & 
Rothbard, 2013), including when the team deals with the crisis (e.g., Ellis, 2006; Gladstein & 
Reilly, 1985; James et al., 2011). In other words, team cognitive processes and collective 
emotions are inherently intertwined and go hand in hand in shaping team performance.  
Despite all this, we currently know very little about the nature of the interplay between 
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cognitive processes and collective emotions in teams facing a crisis event. This is mainly 
because the majority of studies on teams facing crises have focused on the performance effect of 
only one of these behavioural dimensions of team functioning at a time, without accounting for 
its interplay with the other dimension. This may mask the effects of the latter dimension on team 
effectiveness, and results in under- or over-estimating the effect of the former. We are, thus, 
confronted with challenges in adequately predicting team performance during a crisis and 
isolating the underlying causes of a high (versus low) level of team performance after the crisis 
has happened. There is a need to simultaneously account for both cognitive processes and 
collective emotions in the study of teams dealing with crisis events and directly establish a 
relationship between the two constructs. Without a deep and accurate understanding of the 
interplay between cognitive processes and collective emotions, team performance during a crisis 
cannot be adequately predicted.  
In order to properly address this shortcoming in the research literature, I argue, 
researchers should take into account the dynamic nature of team processes (Marks et al., 2001; 
McGrath, 1984) and team-level emotions (Collins et al., 2013; Kelly & Barsade, 2001). The 
dynamism of a construct entails having “a beginning (onset) and an end (offset), a duration, and a 
trajectory of growth and decline” (Roe, Gockel, & Meyer, 2012, p.641). A dynamic construct 
unfolds over a certain timescale – that is, the length of time needed for a construct and for its 
relationships with other constructs to emerge and unfold (Leenders, Contractor, & DeChurch, 
2016; Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 1999). Existing models of team cognitive processes (e.g., 
Knight, 2015; Liu & Maitlis, 2014; Marks et al., 2001; Rafaeli, Ravid, & Cheshin, 2009) and 
theories of collective emotions (Barsade & Knight, 2015; Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008; Walter & 
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Bruch, 2008) emphasize this dynamic view. Empirical research on the interplay between 
cognitive processes and collective emotions during a crisis, however, lags behind in terms of 
incorporating dynamism and often fails to explicitly consider the timescale and the temporal 
unfolding of cognitive processes and collective emotions when it comes to conceptualizing and 
operationalizing each of these constructs. As a result, each empirical study has captured a 
certain, often unique, fraction of the dynamics of the interplay between the two constructs. This 
has led to generating seemingly inconsistent results (e.g., Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Knight & 
Eisenkraft, 2015; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010) and impeded the integration of the findings 
concerning the effectiveness of the interplay between cognitive processes and collective 
emotions.  
Incorporating the dynamic nature of cognitive processes and collective emotions into 
investigation entails using a longitudinal research design in which both constructs are each 
measured multiple times over their timescale. On the one hand, Marks and colleagues’ (2001) 
temporal framework of team processes suggests that the timescale for the unfolding of team 
processes, including cognitive processes, spans a task performance episode. Given a crisis event 
consists of one or more performance episodes (Waller et al., 2014), it can be considered long 
enough to cover at least one timescale for the unfolding of cognitive processes. On the other 
hand, Zaheer and colleagues (1999) suggest that the timescale for the unfolding of continuous 
constructs, such as collective emotions, corresponds to the life span of that construct. In the 
context of research on team functioning during a crisis event, the life span of collective emotions 
that emerge during a crisis is obviously the crisis event itself. Taken together, an appropriate 
observation interval for capturing the evolution of both cognitive processes and collective 
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emotions is the entire duration of a crisis event. Choosing the duration of a crisis as the 
observation interval allows both constructs to emerge and unfold over at least a single length of 
their timescale (Zaheer et al., 1999). By measuring cognitive processes and collective emotions 
at multiple points over the course of a crisis event, researchers can take into account the dynamic 
nature of team processes and team-level emotions and capture the trajectory of change for each 
construct. These trajectories then serve as a basis for investigating the dynamics of the interplay 
between the two constructs. 
When researchers intend to rely on repeated measurements of a dynamic construct, they 
must make further choices about when, for how long, and how often to measure the values of 
their construct of interest. This poses a potentially problematic challenge to researchers since 
there is still very little theory about time lags, feedback loops, and durations that can inform such 
important decisions (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001). One reasonable strategy 
to address this challenge is to measure the construct at very small time intervals (Kozlowski, 
2015; Leenders et al., 2016; Zaheer et al., 1999). This allows researchers to track the evolution of 
the dynamic construct (which is likely nonlinear and unevenly spaced across time) in a fine-
grained temporal scale, “without having to make arbitrary and largely atheoretical decisions 
about time interval” (Leenders et al., 2016). Adopting this strategy for the measurement of team 
cognitive processes and collective emotions entails plotting fine-grained trajectories for both 
constructs, which can then be used to examine the dynamics of the interplay between them at the 
micro-temporal scale (i.e., coupling). Analysis of micro-temporal couplings helps identify those 
co-occurrences of cognitive processes and collective emotions that can strongly discriminate 
higher- from lower-performing teams in the time of crisis. Also, given the coupling between 
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cognitive processes and collective emotions may vary over the course of the crisis, a macro-
temporal analysis of its trajectory throughout the crisis event enables researchers to obtain 
additional insights into the dynamics of the interplay between cognitive processes and collective 
emotions. These additional insights may include information about the types, frequency, 
duration, variability and trend, possible patterns, and the distribution of couplings across time 
(Holmes & Poole, 1991; Lamey, Hollenstein, Lewis, & Granic, 2004). Macro-temporal analysis 
helps researchers specify whether and how the trajectory of the coupling between cognitive 
processes and collective emotions is systematically different in higher- versus lower-performing 
teams facing a crisis event.  
There is a lack of longitudinal research on the dynamics of the interplay, not only 
between cognitive processes and collective emotions, but also among other underlying elements 
of team functioning. This observation could be generalized across different research contexts, 
(i.e., crisis or non-crisis), different forms of interplay (e.g., co-occurrences, sequential strings) 
and different temporal scales (e.g., micro, macro). With respect to the micro-temporal interplay 
between underlying elements of team functioning, there are a few exemplar exceptions. Kolbe 
and colleagues (2014), for example, focused on action teams working in a high-risk environment 
and showed that higher-performing action teams displayed specific sequential patterns of team 
cognitive processes. Lag sequential analysis (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997; Bakeman & Quera, 
2011) revealed that higher-performing teams were characterized by patterns in which team 
member monitoring was directly followed by speaking up, providing assistance, or giving 
instructions and also by patterns in which talking to the room was directly followed by further 
talking to the room and not followed by giving instructions. Their findings suggested that it was 
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not the frequencies of team member monitoring and talking to the room that mattered; rather, it 
was what the team exhibited subsequent to each of these team processes that discriminated 
higher- from lower-performing action teams. In a similar example, Kauffeld and Meyers (2009) 
investigated the sequential strings of three team processes in work group discussions: 
complaining, solution-oriented, and structuring communicative behaviours. Using lag sequential 
analysis, the authors observed that complaining and solution-oriented statements led to 
statements of the same type in group discussions. In other words, complaining encouraged 
further complaining and solution-oriented statements were immediately followed by other 
solution-oriented statements. A complaining behaviour sequence was also found to negatively 
affect measures of team outcome. Moreover, their study showed that structuring statements could 
break the complaining behaviour sequences, because the probability of a structuring statement 
being directly followed by a complaining statement was significantly below chance. Similarly, 
Knight (2015) examined the co-occurrence of team-level mood and team exploratory search – a 
cognitive process defined as experimenting with new ideas and alternative approaches to the 
team’s tasks. He hypothesized that team exploratory search early in a team’s life would be 
positively associated with early team positive mood and negatively associated with early team 
negative mood. Although his findings did not support these hypotheses, there was a strong trend 
in the direction of the predictions for team positive mood. The author suggested that the timing 
of his measurement might have accounted for these non-significant results, and that further 
research with more frequent measurements of team-level mood and team exploratory search 
would be useful to specify the true effect of the interplay between these two constructs.  
The macro-temporal dynamics of the interplay between underlying elements of team 
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functioning has received almost no scholarly attention. Recently, Boon (2016) explored the 
possibility of mutual influence between team creative efficacy and team creative processes over 
time. Using cross-lagged structural equation modeling, she found that these constructs influenced 
one another at certain points in the team’s life and that the direction and magnitude of this effect 
changed over time. One the one hand, the effect of team creative processes on team creative 
efficacy was significant and positive right after the team would move past a performance 
deadline and this effect increased over time. On the other hand, the effect of team creative 
efficacy on team creative processes was significant and positive when the team was approaching 
a deadline and this effect weakened over time. While this research can be considered a step 
forward in the study of the macro-temporal pattern of the relationship between elements of team 
functioning, it did not examine whether and how such dynamics contributed to team 
performance.  
Building on studies such as the above-mentioned ones (Boon, 2016; Kauffeld & Meyers, 
2009; Knight, 2015; Kolbe et al., 2014), the purpose of the present research is to use a 
longitudinal design in order to examine the micro-temporal and macro-temporal dynamics of the 
interplay between team cognitive processes and collective emotions in teams facing a crisis 
event. As my review of literature revealed, theoretical work on this topic is clearly 
underdeveloped and empirical research is lacking. Because of this shortcoming, I take (took) an 
exploratory approach to investigate the following research questions. Such an approach can help 
generate new insights on current inconsistent findings and also discover patterns that previously 
were difficult, if not impossible, to detect (Bamberger & Ang, 2016). 
1) Micro-temporal dynamics: How do micro-temporal couplings of team cognitive 
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processes and collective emotions displayed during the crisis distinguish higher-
performing from lower-performing teams? 
2) Macro-temporal dynamics: How do higher-performing teams and lower-performing 
teams differ in their trajectory of the coupling between team cognitive processes and 
collective emotions over the timespan of a crisis event? 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
Research Context  
I collected data for this research from teams facing a simulated organizational crisis. 
Simulation is commonly used in professional fields such as the military, aviation, firefighting, 
mining, and medicine as an instructional strategy to create highly realistic scenarios and high 
degrees of psychological fidelity in order to train teams how to adapt to nonroutine events 
quickly and accurately (Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Perrow, 1984; Waller et al., 2014). I 
specifically focused on a team-based crisis simulation provided to MBA students as an 
obligatory part of a crisis management course offered at a large Canadian business school. The 
course instructor designed, developed and implemented this simulation in line with the 
instructions provided by Waller and colleagues (2014) on simulation-based training for crisis 
management. The simulation scenario revolved around the unfolding of a crisis happening in an 
organization for which a crisis management team had been formed to quickly design and 
implement an appropriate crisis response. The purpose of the simulation was to provide an 
opportunity for student teams to practice key crisis management capabilities during an 
organizational crisis. York University ethics approval was obtained in advance and all students in 
the course provided written consent to participate in my research allowing me to collect data 
from them before, during, and after the crisis simulation.  
 
Procedure 
The research context in this study is an MBA-level crisis management course that was 
offered in two sections during the winter term in 2016. On Week 7 of the 12-week course, all 
students across both sections of this course were randomly assigned to a total of 20 crisis 
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management teams (4 or 5 members in each team) and randomly assigned the role of one of the 
functional area vice presidents within a hypothetical organization that was about to face the 
simulated crisis9. On Week 9, all students filled out a short questionnaire and on Week 10, every 
student received an information packet about their hypothetical organization including the link to 
the corporate website and a brief memorandum that reflected the current status of their assigned 
functional area within the organization (no information was provided about other functional 
areas).  
On the day of the simulation (Week 11), each student team was directed to a separate 
breakout room where team members were asked to first complete a brief questionnaire. Then, the 
simulation scenario was started at the same time for all teams within each section and lasted for 
about 90 minutes. All teams were video-recorded throughout the simulation. Immediately after 
the end of the simulation, team members were asked to fill out another questionnaire. One week 
after the simulation, the course instructor held a debrief session for each section of the course 
and presented an overview of the crisis that took place during the simulation. She also provided 
every team with actual performance feedback approximately one week after the simulation.  
 
Simulation  
The simulation scenario involved a fictitious organization, Blink Industrial, Inc., a 
technology firm focused on the development of virtual reality training solutions for military 
organizations. A website was created for Blink that presented an overview of the organization 
                                                     
9 In total, there were 19 four-member teams and 1 five-member team. The fifth member in the five-member team 
was assigned the role of an observer. An observer is expected to actively participate in group discussions and help 
shape the team’s response to each incoming communication. However, the observer does not receive and cannot 
send any email messages during the simulation.  
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(overall financial situation, operational strategy, products, etc.) and provided some historical data 
in the form of past press releases. According to the website, Blink’s headquarter was located in 
Toronto and its executive team consisted of CEO, VP R&D, VP External Affairs, VP Finance, 
and VP Marketing. One week before the simulation, students received the link to the website 
along with a brief memorandum related to the functional area associated with their VP role. 
Taken together, the information provided on the website, in the press releases, and in the 
memorandums help form a basis of knowledge construction in simulation training (Waller et al., 
2014). Students were also told to bring at least one Internet-capable device (e.g., laptop, tablet, 
smartphone) to the simulation and were asked for provide an active email address in advance.   
After arriving in their assigned room, team members were first asked to complete a 
questionnaire. They were, then, told that the simulation would begin shortly, and that they would 
have approximately 10 minutes to respond to any externally communicated queries they might 
receive via email. The first communication that the executive team received indicated that the 
simulation had begun. Shortly thereafter, all team members received an email from the CEO of 
the organization saying that she would be on a commercial airline flight and unavailable for the 
next several hours, and that the team needed to choose a venue for an upcoming annual general 
meeting. From this point onward and over the next 90 minutes, executive team members 
received numerous email and Twitter messages at predetermined times, sent by fictitious 
external parties and stakeholders including Blink’s Director of Product Development, US 
Department of Defense as an important client, a news reporter, a subcontractor, Toronto Stock 
Exchange, a stock analyst from a major Canadian bank, an important investor, and a vocal group 
of employees. These messages required the executive team to make several decisions and 
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respond in an appropriate manner under tight time constraints. As appropriate response entails 
that the team was able to quickly update its interpretation of the situation at hand as new 
information continued to surface during the crisis. There were also multiple opportunities for the 
executive team to collect information from and initiate communication with each external party 
and stakeholder during the simulation. In order to simulate actual information flows within and 
across organizations, most external communications were sent only to the appropriate vice-
president roles. For example, media inquiries were sent only to the external affairs and marketing 
VPs, and inquiries from the stock analyst went to R&D and finance VPs. All team members 
received three emails at approximately equal time intervals during the simulation that asked for 
the team’s assessment of the crisis type and the appropriate response strategy, based on what 
they learned from the material covered during the course10. At the end of the simulation, crisis 
management team members received an email from their CEO giving them 30 minutes to 
develop and send her an action plan for Blink to implement within the next 24 hours. 
The main narrative of the crisis simulation revolved around allegations against Blink that 
its new virtual reality training technology – called AlphaScan – had been operating based on 
random data rather than on the supposed advanced algorithm that the company had developed. 
AlphaScan had already been purchased and employed by a number of military organizations 
including Blink’s most important client, US Department of Defense. As the simulation narrative 
unfolded over time, the Blink executive team had to morph into a crisis management team and 
                                                     
10 The main objective of this course was to help students develop knowledge about the characteristics of crisis 
events, developing and implementing crisis plans, and choosing an appropriate strategy to communicate to 
stakeholders during a crisis. The course did not offer any explicit training regarding team dynamics, particularly the 
effective use of team cognitive processes and collective emotions, during a crisis event. Furthermore, prior to the 
crisis simulation, none of the course assignments and class exercises involved working as a team in a crisis-like 
situation. 
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face an organizational crisis, concerning the AlphaScan data problem. The crisis began when US 
Department of Defense suddenly informed Blink that it had suspended its contract with Blink 
because it had discovered that AlphaScan was operating based on random data. US Department 
of Defense also threatened to file fraud charges. Shortly afterwards, the Blink executive team 
received a message from a news reporter pressuring the team to comment on the accusations 
made by US Department of Defense. The reporter also claimed that he had obtained evidence of 
the AlphaScan data problem from an anonymous Blink whistleblower. A vocal group of 
employees also kept posting angry tweets about their work at Blink. At the same time, several 
other external parties and stakeholders (e.g., stock analyst and investor) who had heard about the 
accusations contacted the Blink executive team and demanded a clear explanation. Toward the 
end of this scene, the team received an email that asked for the team’s assessment of the crisis 
type and the appropriate response strategy. The scene ended when the team prepared an answer 
to this request and submitted it. 
The above scene from the simulation scenario matches the defining characteristics of a 
crisis event presented in Chapter 1: low probability of occurrence, taking place unexpectedly, 
high potential impact, with little or no response time available, and ambiguous in terms of cause, 
exact effect, or means of resolution. First, based on the historical data provided in press releases 
and the memorandums, Blink had a very positive track record. So, the Blink executive team had 
no reason to expect such problems. Second, Blink had to face huge consequences when it lost its 
most important client over accusations of fraud and deception. Its reputation among its 
stakeholders and the public was also put at risk. Third, throughout this scene, the crisis 
management team was required to make several decisions on how to deal with different external 
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parties and stakeholders in a timely and appropriate manner (e.g., how to communicate with 
media, whether and how to respond to angry employee tweets, and how to address stakeholders’ 
concerns). Finally, the Blink executive team did not have sufficient information at the time to 
precisely determine the root cause of the problem. It was only after this scene and later in the 
simulation that revelations by Blink’s Director of Product Development and a subcontractor shed 
some light on the true cause of AlphaScan data problem. Taken all together, this specific scene 
from the simulation covers the unfolding of a crisis event – more specifically, from crisis 
inception until the acute stage of the crisis passes. I focus on this crisis scene to address my 
exploratory research questions. The scene started 26 minutes into the simulation and lasted for 
21 minutes on average (SD = 2.73). 
 
Data Collection 
Using a longitudinal research design, I collected three types of data from my research 
context: 1) video recordings of crisis management team members as they worked together during 
the crisis simulation, 2) performance evaluation of teams during the simulation provided by the 
course instructor, and 3) team members’ response to a number of questionnaires that were 
collected on three occasions. First, all crisis management teams were video-recorded (and audio-
recorded) throughout the simulation using two cameras for four-member teams and three 
cameras for the five-member team. I asked the participants to ignore the cameras, which were 
placed at the end of their meeting table and across the room in order to cause as little distraction 
as possible. Observations such as occasional use of swear words in reaction to the content of an 
incoming message or participants making an annoyed/angry face without other members 
knowing indicate that the videotaping was largely ignored by the participants. Video-based data 
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enables using behavioural observation methods and capturing the nuances and subtleties of real-
time behaviours and interactions within the team, particularly cognitive processes and emotional 
displays, at multiple points in time (Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; Waller & Kaplan, 
2018).  
Second, the course instructor provided me with her evaluation of team performance 
during the simulation for all 20 teams. She graded team performance based on a pre-determined 
set of criteria (Waller et al., 2014) including the average time taken to respond to external 
messages and inquiries, the frequency of unsolicited proactive messages sent, the team’s correct 
identification of crisis type and response strategy, and the quality of the 24-hour crisis plan. The 
performance evaluation for each team was quite detailed and contained explicit remarks about 
how well the team performed in response to each and every demand during the simulation. Since 
the focus of this study was on a certain scene from the simulation (i.e., crisis scene), I did not 
need the instructor’s assessment of team performance prior to the crisis scene. Therefore, for 
each team’s performance evaluation, I first pinpointed those assessments pertaining to team 
performance prior to the crisis scene and subtracted points associated with those assessments 
from the total team performance evaluation score. Based on these updated team performance 
evaluation scores, I performed median split to create two clusters of higher- and lower-
performing teams (above the median = higher-performing teams [n = 10 teams], below the 
median = lower-performing teams [n = 10 teams]). The two clusters significantly differed with 
regard to their performance evaluation scores (for higher performers, M = 14.33, SD = .43; for 
lower performers, M = 13.18, SD = .17, U = 0, p < .001)11. Therefore, I felt confident in using the 
                                                     
11 Because of the small sample size, I used Mann-Whitney U test as a nonparametric alternative to the independent 
sample t-test. 
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median split as a means for clustering higher- versus lower-performing teams. This method was 
also previously used in other research on team-level behavioural patterns, particularly when the 
sample size was small (e.g., Kolbe et al., 2014; Stachowski e al., 2009; Waller, 1999; Waller et 
al., 2004). 
Third, team members were asked to fill out a questionnaire at three different points in 
time. The first round was on Week 9, two weeks before the simulation, when they provided some 
personal background information. The second round was on the day of the simulation and 
immediately before the start of the simulation. In this round, participants provided their current 
assessment of their team and completed an extended version of international short form of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (I-PANAS-SF; Thompson, 2007) to indicate the extent to 
which they were experiencing 18 discrete emotions at the present moment. The third and final 
round of questionnaire was administered immediately after the end of the simulation asking 
participants to evaluate their team’s performance during the simulation. The primary source of 
data in this research study was video recordings, team performance evaluations, and participants’ 
response to the personal background questionnaire. 
 
Data Coding  
Data coding was conducted in two phases. The purpose of the first phase is to select and 
refine two coding schemes, one for team cognitive processes and another for collective emotions. 
In the second phase of data coding, I hired and trained four research assistants, two for coding 
cognitive processes and two for coding collective emotions, to code all the videotapes using the 
most refined version of the coding scheme.  
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Coding Scheme Selection and Refinement 
The behavioural coding scheme that was used to capture team cognitive processes was a 
slightly modified version of the Co-ACT coding scheme (Kolbe, Burtscher, & Manser, 2013). 
Co-ACT was originally developed to capture behavioural dimensions of team functioning in 
acute care teams. It consists of 12 behavioural codes that are organized into four quadrants (see 
Figure 2). Each quadrant represents one of the combinations of two basic dimensions of 
teamwork behaviours: explicit versus implicit, and action versus situation12. The primary 
purpose of Co-ACT is to operationalize the four categories of cognitive processes presented in 
Kolbe and colleagues’ framework (Kolbe et al., 2009, 2011, 2013; Manser et al., 2008). As my 
review of literature suggested, this framework provides a useful tool for capturing cognitive 
processes that are most relevant to team functioning during a crisis.  
The Co-ACT coding scheme was refined and improved throughout the coding process to 
fit my specific research context and increase intercoder reliability. As a result, the definition, 
description and examples of behaviours under each category were clarified or updated. 
Moreover, a new behaviour (i.e., action-focused inquiry, depicted in italics in Figure 2) was 
added to the category of explicit action processing to help the coders distinguish between 
different types of questions that members ask each other about a decision/action. Finally, in order 
for the coding scheme to become mutually exclusive and exhaustive, a fifth coding category (i.e., 
residual) was added to the coding scheme to capture all other instances of behavioural processes 
that do not exactly belong to any of the four main categories of team cognitive processes. 
                                                     
12 Kolbe and colleagues used the term “information” to label situation-focused processes. I changed this label and 
used the term “situation” instead, because the latter term reflects the definition of its corresponding dimension more 
precisely and helps clarify the differences between the two types of information being processed.  
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Examples of behaviours under this fifth category include acknowledgements, incomplete or 
inaudible sentences, utterances that do not fit the definition of a cognitive process, and multiple 
cognitive processes occurring simultaneously. A summary of the coding scheme is presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 2. Coding scheme for team cognitive processes  
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Previous research shows that team-level collective emotions can be recognized and 
reliably assessed by outside observers when using an appropriate coding scheme (Barsade 2002; 
Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Lehmann-Willenbrock et al., 2011; Sanchez-Burks, Bartel, Rees & 
Huy, 2016). In order to capture the behavioural manifestations of collective emotions in teams, I 
developed a behavioural coding scheme, building on two existing emotion coding frameworks: 
Observer’s Instrument for Work Group Mood (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000) and Displayed Emotion 
Coding Scheme (Liu & Maitlis, 2014). Observer’s Instrument for Work Group Mood was 
specifically developed to assess emotions expressed in a team setting and presents a list of 
behavioural anchors associated with each of the emotion categories in the circumplex model of 
emotion, except for the category of midaroused-neutral. In order to provide more information for 
coders and enhance their coding precision, this framework was supplemented with verbal and 
nonverbal behavioural cues provided in Displayed Emotion Coding Scheme (Liu & Maitlis, 
2014). Displayed Emotion Coding Scheme provides a set of behavioural indicators for eight 
specific emotions displayed in teams (i.e., excited, amused, relaxed, angry, annoyed, frustrated, 
contemptuous, and neutral). Observer’s Instrument for Work Group Mood and Displayed 
Emotion Coding Scheme fit well together, given both have been developed based on the 
circumplex model of emotion (see Table 3). Therefore, it was rather quick and effortless for me 
to combine these two coding schemes into one behavioural coding scheme for collective 
emotions. This coding scheme was then refined and improved throughout the coding process. 
Some behavioural anchors were added or modified under each emotion category. Moreover, all 
three categories of low arousal were removed from the behavioural coding scheme, because 
video observations revealed that the characteristics of the task during the crisis scene (i.e., high 
impact, time pressure, quick unfolding of the simulation narrative, every team member receiving 
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at least one external communication during the crisis scene) put all team members in an active 
mode and kept the team away from becoming inactive or inattentive. A summary of the 
behavioural coding scheme is presented in Appendix B. 
The behavioural indicators that were listed under each emotion category in the 
behavioural coding scheme are essentially at the individual level – that is, they help the coders to 
assess each member’s displayed emotion within the team. But the coders also needed a clear 
instruction as to how to move beyond coding these individual-level displays of emotion toward 
generating an overall assessment of collective emotion at the team level. Through an iterative 
process between existing guidelines (e.g., Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Sanchez-Burks et al., 2016) 
and video observations, I developed a decision flowchart for identifying team-level collective 
emotion. The flowchart asks the coder to first identify all members’ expressions of emotions 
using the behavioural coding scheme. Then, it outlines a process through which the coder would 
be able to assign the most appropriate emotion category to the team-level collective emotion, 
taking into account all individual-level displays of emotion. Similar to the behavioural coding 
scheme, the decision flowchart was refined and improved throughout the coding process. By 
systemizing the coding procedure for collective emotions, the decision flowchart helped the 
coders produce more reliable codes. It also resulted in further adjusting the behavioural coding 
scheme to the team-level context by adding a new category for capturing dispersed emotions. 
Dispersed emotions represent a particular form of collective emotion that occurs when there is 
meaningful variation in team members’ emotional expressions (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; 
Sanchez-Burks & Huy, 2009; Sanchez-Burks et al., 2016). Collective emotion is coded as 
dispersed when there are different pockets of emotion categories within the team and these 
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various emotional expressions do not converge into one dominant emotion category at the team 
level during the coding interval. Adding the category of dispersed emotions enhances the 
precision of the coding process because it signals to the coders that they now need to carefully 
examine the distribution of individual-level displays of emotion within the team and observe 
whether and how this distribution changes during the coding interval before assigning the most 
appropriate code to the team’s collective emotion. The decision flowchart is included in 
Appendix C. Overall, the behavioural coding scheme ended up constituting seven emotion 
categories. Table 3 provides more details about how the criteria for coding individual-level 
displays of each emotion category were obtained from the two existing coding schemes and how 
team-level collective emotion was coded based on the newly developed decision flowchart. 
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Table 3.  
Criteria for coding emotions at the individual level and at the team level  
 
Emotion Category 
Criteria for Coding  
at the Individual Level 
Criteria for Coding  
at the Team Level 
 Matching the coding 
categories identified in the two 
existing coding schemes with 
the emotion categories in my 
coding scheme 
 
Decision Flowchart  
(see Appendix C) 
Aroused-positive Bartel & Saavedra (2000):  
Activated pleasant 
 
Liu & Maitlis (2014):  
Excited 
 
The majority of the team members express one or 
more behavioural cues associated with aroused-
positive emotion at the individual-level. 
Expressions of aroused-positive emotion among team 
members must last for at least 3 seconds altogether. 
 
Aroused-Neutral Bartel & Saavedra (2000):  
High activation 
 
The majority of the team members express one or 
more behavioural cues associated with aroused-
neutral emotion at the individual-level. 
Expressions of aroused-neutral emotion among team 
members must last for at least 3 seconds altogether. 
 
Aroused-Negative Bartel & Saavedra (2000):  
Activated unpleasant 
 
Liu & Maitlis (2014):  
Angry  
 
The majority of the team members express one or 
more behavioural cues associated with aroused-
negative emotion at the individual-level. 
Expressions of aroused-negative emotion among 
team members must last for at least 3 seconds 
altogether. 
 
Midaroused-Positive Bartel & Saavedra (2000):  
Pleasant  
 
The majority of the team members express one or 
more behavioural cues associated with midaroused-
positive emotion at the individual-level. 
Expressions of midaroused-positive emotion among 
team members must last for at least 3 seconds 
altogether. 
 
Midaroused-Neutral Liu & Maitlis (2014):  
Neutral 
 
The majority of the team members express one or 
more behavioural cues associated with midaroused-
neutral emotion at the individual-level. 
Expressions of midaroused-neutral emotion among 
team members must last for at least 3 seconds 
altogether. 
 
 
  
  
47 
 
Table 3. (continued) 
 
 
Emotion Category 
Criteria for Coding  
at the Individual Level 
Criteria for Coding  
at the Team Level 
 Matching the coding 
categories identified in the two 
existing coding schemes with 
the emotion categories in my 
coding scheme 
 
Decision Flowchart  
(see Appendix C) 
Midaroused-Negative Bartel & Saavedra (2000):  
Unpleasant  
 
Liu & Maitlis (2014):  
Annoyed, Frustrated, 
Contemptuous 
 
The majority of the team members express one or 
more behavioural cues associated with midaroused-
negative emotion at the individual-level. 
Expressions of midaroused-negative emotion among 
team members must last for at least 3 seconds 
altogether. 
 
Dispersed  Not applicable to individual-
level emotion coding 
 
There are two subgroups within the team and each 
subgroup expresses a distinct collective emotion 
category; Or 
Every single member of the team is expressing a 
distinct emotion category. 
 
Note:  
 
Activation = Arousal 
 
Coding interval = 10 seconds 
 
Although Bartel & Saavedra (2000) did not explicitly indicate the level of activation in “pleasant” and 
“unpleasant” emotion categories, they based their work on the circumplex model of emotion (shown in Figure 1, 
p. 207) which clearly shows that these two emotion categories are at the midpoint of the activation dimension 
(i.e., medium level of arousal).  
 
Although Bartel & Saavedra (2000) did not explicitly indicate the degree of valence in “high activation” and 
“low activation” emotion categories, they based their work on the circumplex model of emotion (shown in 
Figure 1, p. 207) which clearly shows that these two emotion categories are at the midpoint of the valence 
dimension (i.e., neutral valence).  
 
Liu & Maitlis (2014) explicitly indicated the level of arousal when describing the behavioural cues associated 
with some of the discrete emotions in their coding scheme (e.g., annoyed). For other discrete emotions, the 
description of the behavioural cues could be matched with the definition of either a low, medium or high level of 
arousal (e.g., the behavioural cues provided for the category of “neutral” emotion in their coding scheme 
essentially describes a midaroused-neutral emotion category).  
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Coding Cognitive Processes and Collective Emotions 
Following Waller and Kaplan’s (2018) guidelines for using video-based behavioural 
observation methods, I recruited two coders for coding cognitive processes and another two for 
coding collective emotions in each team during the crisis event. The coders were extensively 
trained to use their assigned coding scheme (separate training sessions held for each pair of 
coders). They were also provided with video clips from sample recordings to practice. Weekly 
calibration meetings were scheduled to discuss and minimize discrepancies. After the training 
was completed, the coders independently coded 20% of the video data for the purpose of 
calculating intercoder agreement (Bakeman, Deckner, & Quera, 2005). During this period, I 
arranged and facilitated regular meetings where the coders could compare their codes, discuss 
discrepancies, and agree on a final code for each case of discrepancy. Given cognitive processes 
and collective emotions were each coded sequentially, I used a software program called 
Generalized Sequential Querier (GSEQ) to calculate intercoder agreement associated with 
coding each construct. GSEQ was developed by Bakeman and Quera (1995, 2011) for the 
analysis of sequential observational data. GSEQ computes kappa as an index of point-by-point 
agreement between coders (Bakeman & Quera, 2011; Bakemen, Quera, & Gnisci, 2009). The 
overall kappa for team cognitive processes was .64 (73% agreement). According to the guideline 
provided by Bakeman and Quera (2011) for the interpretation of kappa values, this value 
indicates an acceptable level of agreement for sequential data. Therefore, the remaining 80% of 
video data was divided equally between the two coders. Two kappas were calculated for 
collective emotions, one for the dimension emotional valence and one for the dimension of 
emotional arousal. The main reason was that as the coding process evolved, the coders and I 
discovered that each dimension of collective emotion would have to be independently evaluated 
  
49 
 
to produce an accurate code for collective emotion. Our observation is also consistent with the 
previous characterization of emotional valence and emotional arousal as conceptually and 
statistically distinct dimensions of emotion (Ozcelik, 2017; Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 
1989). The overall kappa was .52 for emotional valence (78% agreement) and .61 for emotional 
arousal (80% agreement). Both of these values also indicate an acceptable level of agreement for 
coding sequential data (Bakeman & Quera, (2011). Therefore, the remaining 80% of video data 
was divided equally between the two coders. Individual values of kappa for each category of 
team cognitive processes are presented in Appendix A. Individual values of kappa for each 
category of emotional valence and emotional arousal are presented in Appendix B.  
The coding process for team cognitive processes followed Waller and Kaplan’s (2018) 
guideline for event coding. Accordingly, the two coders hired to code cognitive processes were 
asked to record all discrete occurrences of each of the key behaviours identified in the cognitive 
process coding scheme within each 10-second interval. This method has been used in several 
other studies of team interactions (e.g., Su et al., 2013; Waller, 1999; Waller et al., 2004) to 
increase the ease and speed at which the coders would complete and compare their work (Waller 
& Kaplan, 2018). The two coders recruited to code collective emotions were instructed to 
identify the presence or absence of each category of collective emotion within each 10-second 
interval. At the end of the coding process, the stream of cognitive process codes was aligned with 
the stream of collective emotion codes along their corresponding 10-second intervals to generate 
a final code sheet for each team.  
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Data Analysis  
Micro-temporal Dynamics 
My first research question concerns the micro-temporal dynamics of the coupling 
between team cognitive processes and collective emotions during a crisis event. Coupling refers 
to the co-occurrence of cognitive processes and collective emotions. In order to address this 
question, I used lag sequential analysis (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997; Bakeman & Quera, 2011). 
This method allows for examining temporal patterns in concurrently coded variables to 
determine which co-occurrences occur significantly above or beyond chance. Accordingly, I 
conducted lag sequential analysis at lag = 0 to specify how often a certain cognitive process 
category co-occurs with a certain collective emotion category. I carried out this analysis 
separately for each performance cluster (i.e., one lag sequential analysis for higher-performing 
teams and one for lower-performing ones). The results of these analyses would reveal the more 
(or less) effective micro-temporal couplings between team cognitive processes and collective 
emotions during a crisis event.  
Prior to performing the analysis, I checked whether the length of the sequential data (i.e., 
number of codes) associated with each team would allow for valid sequential analysis. Adopting 
the formula suggested by Wickens (1989), the calculations revealed that every team’s sequential 
data must contain at least 175 codes. Given the length of the sequential data across the 20 teams 
ranged between 184 to 353 codes, I was allowed to perform lag sequential analysis. Next, I 
created a contingency table for each team by crossing all five cognitive process categories and all 
seven collective emotion categories (5 × 7 table). Each contingency table contains joint 
frequencies for every combination of cognitive process × collective emotion categories. 
According to the guidelines for lag sequential analysis (Bakeman & Quera, 2011; Klonek, Quera, 
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Burba, & Kauffeld, 2016; Yoder & Symons, 2010), in order to obtain statistical parameters that 
can be trusted, the expected value for any joint frequency in the contingency table should be at 
least five, and row/column sums of joint frequencies should be larger than 30. These two criteria 
were not fully met in most of the 5 × 7 contingency tables across the 20 teams. This could render 
the accuracy of the interpretation of sequential analysis questionable. Klonek and colleagues 
(2016) recommend two strategies to address this issue. The first is to combine and integrate 
coded categories associated with each construct in a theoretically meaningful way to create a 
smaller set of higher-order categories. Adopting this strategy, I created smaller contingency 
tables for each of the four categories of team cognitive processes in which the focal cognitive 
process category was placed at the first row and all other instances of coded processes (four other 
categories in the cognitive process coding scheme, or simply “Other”) was placed at the second 
row. I was also able to combine collective emotion categories along each of their two basic 
dimensions (i.e., arousal and valence), given these dimensions have been characterized as 
independent and distinct from one another (Ozcelik, 2017; Russell et al.,1989). This resulted in 
the formation of three categories for collective emotional arousal (high arousal, medium arousal, 
and dispersed) and four categories for collective emotional valence (positive, neutral, negative, 
and dispersed). Since the dispersed emotions category could not be characterized along any of 
these two dimensions, it appeared in both new categorizations. These two new categorizations of 
collective emotions constituted the columns of the contingency tables. In other words, each 
contingency table included either three columns associated with categories of collective 
emotional arousal or four columns representing categories of collective emotional valence. 
Taken together, each team cognitive process category was analyzed using two separate 
contingency tables, one for investigating the coupling of that cognitive process category with 
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collective emotional arousal (2 × 3 table) and one for examining its coupling with collective 
emotional valence (2 × 4 table). Figure 3 shows an example of 2 × 3 and 2 × 4 contingency 
tables generated for one of the teams (Team 10) to analyze the coupling of explicit situation 
processing with collective emotional arousal and with collective emotional valence, respectively.  
 
Figure 3. Example of a 2 × 3 contingency table (top) and a 2 × 4 contingency table (bottom) generated 
for Team 10 
 
 
The second strategy suggested by Klonek and colleagues (2016) is to pool all sequential 
data across teams. In the context of my research, this strategy would entail pooling data across all 
the ten teams associated with each performance cluster. More specifically, I had to generate two 
pooled contingency tables (2 × 3 and 2 × 4) for each category of team cognitive processes in 
each performance cluster. But in order to be able to pool data across a set of teams, researchers 
first need to establish homogeneity (i.e., similarity of contingency tables) among those teams. 
Tests of homogeneity can help to alleviate the risk of over-generalizing findings that arise in 
only a few teams within the set (Chorney, Garcia, Berlin, Bakeman, & Kain, 2010; Connor, 
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Fletcher, & Salmon, 2009; Klonek et al., 2016). Accordingly, I used log-linear analysis 
(Bakeman & Gottman, 1997) to test for the homogeneity of each of the two contingency tables 
generated for each category of team cognitive processes. Separate tests were conducted for 
higher-performing and lower-performing teams (total of 8 tests for each performance cluster). 
Nonsignificant likelihood ratio 𝐺2(p > .05) indicates homogeneity and allows for using the 
pooled contingency table for subsequent lag sequential analysis. Nonhomogeneous contingency 
tables were excluded from further analysis.  
Lag sequential analysis begins with testing for a global association within the pooled 
contingency table. A significant 𝜒2-value indicates that there is at least one association between 
coupled categories that is not determined by chance (i.e., the cognitive process category co-
occurs more often with at least one collective emotion category and less often with others). If 
there is a significant global association, researchers are allowed to further look for cell-specific 
couplings and investigate which coupled categories are significantly associated. Adjusted 
residuals (Bakeman & Quera, 2011) are calculated and tested to identify significant cell-specific 
couplings. Adjusted residuals are standardized raw residuals (based on the difference between 
the observed and expected joint frequency). This cell-specific statistic reveals whether the 
coupling is more or less likely to be expected by chance. If an adjusted residual is > 1.96 (p < 
.05), there is a significant positive association between the coupled categories; if it is < -1.96 (p < 
.05), there is a negative association between them (Bakeman & Quera, 1995; Klonek et al., 
2016). Given cellwise statistics often entail multiple tests, a reduced alpha level may be used to 
protect against type I error (Bakeman, Robinson, & Quera, 1996). Applying the Bonferroni-
correction, the overall alpha value should be divided by the number of tests performed within the 
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pooled contingency table to create a new alpha value for each cell-specific test. Since each 
pooled contingency table was created to examine the couplings pertaining to a certain cognitive 
process category (not “Other” category), the number of tests performed within each contingency 
table would be equal to the number of cells in a row. Therefore, choosing the overall significance 
level of .05, the Bonferroni-corrected alpha level for each test within a pooled contingency table 
containing categories of collective emotional arousal would be .016 (.05 divided by 3) and for 
each test within a pooled contingency table containing categories of collective emotional valence 
would be .012 (.05 divided by 4). These new alpha values were applied to indicate the 
significance of adjusted residuals in each pooled contingency table. The software program GSEQ 
was used to both test the global associations and identify statistically significant cell-specific 
couplings.  
Since my first research question looked for those couplings that could differentiate 
higher- from lower-performing teams, I only focused on those contingency tables that underwent 
the entire procedure of lag sequential analysis in both performance clusters so that I could make 
a comparison between the two clusters of teams. More specifically, if a certain contingency table 
was found to be nonhomogeneous among either higher- or lower-performing teams, that 
contingency table was excluded from subsequent lag sequential analysis all together. For 
example, pooled contingency tables for the co-occurrence of explicit action processing with 
collective emotional arousal and with collective emotional valence were removed from lag 
sequential analysis due to a lack homogeneity. 
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Macro-temporal Dynamics 
My second research question concerns the macro-temporal dynamics of the coupling of 
team cognitive processes and collective emotions throughout a crisis event. In order to answer 
this question, I used a software program called GridWare (Lamey et al., 2004) to plot the 
trajectory of change in the coupling of cognitive processes and collective emotions over the 
course of the crisis event. GridWare was developed based on the work of three developmental 
psychologists (Lewis, Lamey & Douglas, 1999) to represent the dynamics of the interplay 
between two synchronized streams of categorical data on a two-dimensional grid (Figure 4). This 
program provides visualization and characterizes two macro-temporal features of the trajectory 
of coupled time series: structure and content. 
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Figure 4. Example of GridWare output that displays (middle window) and provides characterizing 
measures (right window) for the trajectory of change in the coupling of variable 1 and variable 2. Each 
cell on the grid represents the coupling of a certain category of variable 1 with a certain category of 
variable 2. The user can select trajectories to display based on a pre-specified set of criteria (left window).  
 
As an initial step, I used my coded sequential data as a basis to generate one GirdWare 
file and twenty trajectory files (one file per team). These files were used as input to GridWare. A 
GridWare file specified the categorical data (i.e., cognitive processes and collective emotions) 
and listed general features of the coupling trajectories associated with each team (i.e., team 
number and performance cluster). Each trajectory file contained two synchronized streams of 
categorical data (one stream for cognitive processes and another for collective emotions) 
associated with each team. These files were prepared according to the guidelines outlined in the 
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GridWare manual13. Once these input files were read in to GridWare, GridWare could display 
and provide characterizing measures for every team’s coupling trajectory. The trajectories would 
be displayed on a two-dimensional grid that has five categories of cognitive processes on the x-
axis and seven categories of collective emotions on the y-axis (see Figure 5). Each cell on the 
grid represents the coupling between a certain category of cognitive processes and a certain 
category of collective emotions. GridWare provides several measures to characterize the 
structure as well as the content of each team’s coupling trajectory. These measures were then 
used to perform an analysis on the structure (also called whole-grid analysis) and on the content 
(also called attractor analysis) of the coupling trajectories of teams. This enabled me to compare 
higher- and lower-performing teams’ coupling trajectories in terms of structure and content. 
 
Figure 5. Example of GridWare trajectory display for my dataset  
                                                     
13 Retrieved from the official website for GridWare: http://statespacegrids.org/ 
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Whole-grid Analysis. The structural measures are also called whole-grid measures 
because they are derived from the information across all the cells. Structural measures are mostly 
used to specify the overall variability of a coupling trajectory. Variability refers to moment-to-
moment fluctuations of a coupling trajectory due to the reciprocal influence of its underlying 
elements (Hollenstein, 2013). Variability has two dimensions: 1) the range of different cells that 
a coupling trajectory visits over time, and 2) the frequency of shifting in and out of different cells 
over time (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2016). If a coupling trajectory remains in a small number of 
cells and makes few transitions between cells, this trajectory may be characterized as rigid or 
inflexible. In contrast, a coupling trajectory that moves around to many cells across the grid and 
makes frequent changes between cells may indicate a highly variable or flexible pattern 
(Hollenstein, 2007). One of the primary GridWare measures for capturing the first dimension of 
variability is dispersion. Dispersion determines the spread of the coupling trajectory across the 
grid and is calculated as the sum of the squared proportional durations across all cells, corrected 
for the number of cells, and inverted so that values range from 0 (no dispersion at all – trajectory 
remains in one cell over time) to 1 (maximum dispersion – trajectory is equally distributed across 
the grid). This measure is produced by the following formula (Hollenstein, 2007): 
Dispersion = 1 −
(𝑛 ∑(𝑑𝑖/𝐷)
2 − 1
𝑛 − 1
 
Where D is the total duration of the coupling trajectory, 𝑑𝑖 is the duration in cell i, and n 
is the total number of cells in the grid. GridWare automatically calculates dispersion and displays 
its value in the Measures window (right window in Figure 3).  
The second dimension of variability is often captured by a measure called transitions per 
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minute. The measure of transitions denotes the number of transitions between cells within the 
grid. Transitions can be directly derived from GridWare Measures window. When the duration 
of coupling trajectories within the sample is not the same, researchers often prefer to use 
transitions per minute instead of transitions (Hollenstein & Lewis, 2006). Transitions per minute 
is calculated by dividing transitions by the total duration of the trajectory. Given the focus of my 
research was on the dynamics of the coupling trajectory throughout the crisis scene and the 
duration of the crisis scene was not exactly equal across teams (M = 21, SD = 2.73), I used 
transitions per minute to capture the second dimension of variability. Higher values of transitions 
per minute denotes greater variability.  
 
Attractor Analysis. GridWare measures of content describe the characteristics of one or 
multiple cells selected within the grid. These measures are mostly used to identify attractors and 
quantify attractor strength. An attractor is defined as one cell (or a group of cells) on the grid 
that “attracts” the trajectory away from entering other cells across the grid. Attractors have been 
depicted topographically as valleys on a dynamic landscape (see Figure 6). The deeper the 
attractor, the more likely the trajectory is to “fall” into it and remain there, and the more resistant 
the trajectory is to changes in the environment (Hollenstein, 2007; Mainhard, Pennings, 
Wubbels, & Brekelmans, 2012). As a result, an attractor has two main characteristics: 1) it has 
the highest probability of recurrence (i.e., duration), and 2) it has the shortest return latency (i.e., 
the time it takes before the trajectory returns to the cell) than other cells across the grid. Coupling 
between two variables essentially tends to move in a trajectory towards the attractor cell(s). Once 
the trajectory enters an attractor, it is difficult for the trajectory to be freed from it (Hollenstein, 
2013). Lewis and colleagues (1999) developed a two-step process for identifying and evaluating 
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attractor cell(s) on the grid. The first step is to specify the location of attractor cell(s). The second 
step is to further ascertain that the identified attractor is significantly stronger than other cells 
across the grid. 
  
 
Figure 6. The landscape of an attractor. The depth of the valley represents the strength of the attractor  
(Adapted from Vallacher, Van Geert, & Nowak, 2015) 
 
Attractor cells are, by definition, more probable than other cells on the grid (first 
characteristic of attractors stated above). Therefore, the most straightforward method of 
identifying an attractor on the grid is to find it among the cells with highest duration14 
(Hollenstein, 2013). Lewis and colleagues (1999) suggested a winnowing procedure to detect the 
location of attractors based on cell durations. This procedure begins with considering all the cells 
as potential attractors and progresses in an iterative fashion by eliminating the cell with the 
lowest duration in the set one-by-one in each step. Eventually, the cell or cells with the highest 
                                                     
14 Cell duration can be directly obtained from the GridWare Measures window.   
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duration remain based on a criterion called heterogeneity score. In order to generate the 
heterogeneity score at each iterative step, the expected value is first calculated as the total 
duration of the trajectory divided by the number of cells in that iteration. Then, each cell’s 
deviation from that expected value is squared and summed across cells. This sum is then divided 
by the number of cells in that iteration to obtain the heterogeneity score: 
Heterogeneity𝑗 =
∑(𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑖 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗)
2/𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑗
# 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑗
 
where i is an index of the cell and j is an index of the current iteration. Cells are 
eliminated one by one in each iterative step until there was little change (< 50%) in the 
heterogeneity score. This resulted in one or multiple cells with the highest cell durations. 
Once the location of attractor cell(s) is identified in the first step, Lewis and colleagues 
(1999) suggested taking a second step to further ascertain that the identified attractor cell(s) is 
significantly stronger than other cells. The relative strength, or pull that the attractor has on the 
coupling trajectory, is operationalized as the probability of transition from other cells into the 
attractor cell(s) (i.e., second characteristic of attractors stated earlier). Therefore, the most direct 
way to measure attractor strength is using the index of return visits. Return visits is defined as 
the latency to return to the selected cell(s) and calculated as the number of discrete visits to any 
of the other cells before returning to the selected cell(s). Lower return visits (faster returns) 
indicate a stronger attractor (Hollenstein, 2007; Lewis et al., 1999). Return visits can be directly 
obtained from the GridWare Measures window. In order to determine whether the attractor is 
significantly stronger than other cells, the return visits measure of each attractor is compared 
with the return visits measure of a “nonattractor” cell. Nonattractor is defined as the last cell 
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eliminated from the list of potential attractors in the winnowing procedure. For those grids that 
have a multicell attractor (as opposed to a single-cell attractor), the attractor cell with the lowest 
duration should be chosen for comparison with the nonattractor cell. Statistical tests are 
performed and if the return visits of the attractor are found to be significantly lower than the 
return visits of the nonattractor cell, it can be inferred that the attractor has a stronger pull than 
other cells on the grid (Lewis et al., 1999).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
Table 4 displays means, standard deviations and intercorrelations between demographic 
variables and team performance evaluation scores. Demographics were obtained from the 
participants’ response to one of the pre-simulation questionnaires and aggregated to the team 
level. As shown in the table, team performance during the crisis event was not associated with 
any of these demographic variables.  
I also compared higher-performing and lower-performing teams in terms of how 
frequently they exhibited each of the coded categories of team cognitive processes and collective 
emotions during the crisis event. Considering that the duration of the crisis scene in my research 
context was not exactly equal across teams (M = 21, SD = 2.73), I based my comparisons on the 
relative frequencies of coded variables in order to have a more meaningful comparison between 
higher- and lower-performing teams. Relative frequencies were calculated by dividing the 
number of instances of each coded variable by the duration of the crisis scene. I used the Mann-
Whitney U test as a nonparametric alternative to the independent sample t-test to accommodate 
my small sample size. Nonparametric statistics are inferential tests that do not require 
assumptions about the distribution of the population from which the samples were taken (Hinkle, 
Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003). Separate Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted on each of the coded 
variables (see Table 5). With the exception of implicit situation processing, which was more 
likely to occur in higher-performing teams than in lower-performing ones (for higher performers, 
M = 3.14, SD = .76; for lower performers, M = 2.27, SD = .66, U = 18, p = .015), there were no 
significant differences between higher- and lower-performing teams in terms of how frequently 
they exhibited each category of cognitive processes and collective emotions during the crisis. 
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This could be an indication that in most cases, cognitive processes and collective emotions did 
not necessarily operate in isolation to shape team performance during a crisis event. Indeed, it is 
possible that each cognitive process category had to go hand in hand with a certain collective 
emotion to be able to characterize higher (versus lower) team performance during the crisis. In 
the next step, I carefully investigated this possibility by examining the dynamics of these co-
occurrences at both micro-temporal (first research question) and macro-temporal (second 
research question) scales.  
 
Table 4.  
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations between demographic variables and team performance 
evaluation scores 
 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Average age  28.82 1.67 – -.51* .72* 0.29 0.25 
2. Team gender composition 2.95 1.05  
– 
-0.38 -0.15 0.04 
3. Average work experience 3.12 0.44  
 – 0.03 0.03 
4. Average prior experience in crisis 
management  
0.82 0.52 
  
 – -0.23 
5. Team performance evaluation scores 13.55 0.72 
  
  – 
 
Note: N = 20 teams 
Gender composition of the team was dummy coded (1 = all teammates male; 2 = majority of teammates male; 3 
= half of teammates male, 4 = majority of teammates female, 5 = all teammates female). 
Work experience at individual level was dummy coded (1 = less than 1 year, 2 = 1-3 years, 3 = 3-5 years, 4 = 
more than 5 years). 
Prior experience in crisis management was measured with the single questionnaire item “How many times have 
you been involved in handling a real organizational crisis?”  
* p < .05 
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Table 5.  
Mean relative frequencies, standard deviations, and comparison of relative frequencies of coded variables 
between higher- and lower-performing teams 
 
 Higher Performers  Lower Performers 
U 
 
p 
  
M SD  M SD 
Team Cognitive Processes:        
Explicit situation processing  1.31 .57  1.74 .67 66 .25 
Implicit situation processing 3.14 .76  2.27 .66 18 .015* 
Explicit action processing  5.94 1.07  5.68 1.48 42 .58 
Implicit action processing .42 .18  .38 .17 45 .74 
Residual 2.73 1.01  3.26 1.09 59 .53 
        
Collective Emotions:        
Aroused-positive  .66 .41  1.00 .71 67 .22 
Aroused-neutral 2.96 1.45  3.96 2.36 63 .35 
Aroused-negative  .76 .59  .97 .72 58.5 .53 
Midaroused-positive .93 .66  .58 .54 33 .22 
Midaroused-neutral 6.46 .74  5.43 1.81 30 .14 
Midaroused-negative 1.08 .56  .73 .59 35 .28 
Dispersed emotions .68 .45  .67 .52 48.5 .91 
Note: Results based on 10 higher performing teams and 10 lower-performing teams 
Relative frequency = absolute frequency per minute 
U = Mann-Whitney U 
* p < .05 
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Micro-temporal Dynamics 
My first research question concerns the micro-temporal dynamics of the coupling 
between team cognitive processes and collective emotions during a crisis event. More 
specifically, I asked: How do micro-temporal couplings of team cognitive processes and 
collective emotions displayed during the crisis distinguish higher-performing from lower-
performing teams? 
Accordingly, I performed lag sequential analyses to determine which observed couplings 
of team cognitive processes and collective emotions were statistically meaningful in either 
higher- or lower-performing teams facing a crisis event. Below, I present the results, organizing 
them based on the coupling of each cognitive process category with collective emotions.  
 
Coupling of Explicit Situation Processing and Collective Emotions 
As previously described in Chapter 2, explicit situation processing captures those 
cognitive processes that are focused on understating the situation while being enacted in an 
explicit mode. In other words, explicit situation processing involves reciprocal interactions 
between team members about the situation at hand. Examples of this cognitive process category 
include requesting information from another team member, evaluating and discussing 
information with teammates, or sharing information upon request (see Figure 2). In order to 
explore whether and how explicit situation processing co-occurs with a certain collective 
emotion category, I followed the procedure outlined in Chapter 3 (see the first section under Data 
Analysis for more details). As an initial step, I generated two contingency tables for each team, 
one for investigating the coupling of this cognitive process category with collective emotional 
arousal and one for examining its coupling with collective emotional valence. The latter 
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contingency table was found to lack homogeneity across higher-performing teams (𝐺2(27) =
71.75,  p < .01), thus preventing me from performing lag sequential analysis and comparing 
higher- and lower-performing teams in terms of the co-occurrence of explicit situation 
processing and the valence dimension of collective emotions. Lag sequential analysis was 
successfully performed on the contingency tables associated with the coupling of explicit 
situation processing and the arousal dimension of collective emotions. As shown in Table 6, 
higher-performing teams were found to differ from lower-performing teams in the level of 
emotional arousal they were less likely to express during the exhibition of explicit situation 
processing. More specifically, the co-occurrence of explicit situation processing with collective 
midaroused emotion was significantly below chance in higher-performing teams, as opposed to 
lower-performing ones (for higher performers, ADRJ = -2.67, p =.01; for lower performers, 
ADRJ = -1.49, p =.14).  
 
Table 6.  
Adjusted residuals for the coupling of explicit situation processing and collective emotions  
 
Cognitive process:  
Explicit situation processing 
 
Co-occurring collective emotion 
High  
arousal 
Medium 
arousal 
Dispersed 
emotions 
Higher-performing teams 1.55 -2.67* 2.62 
Lower-performing teams 0.11 -1.49 3.17 
 
Note: Results based on 10 higher performing teams and 10 lower-performing 
teams  
* p < .016 (Bonferroni-corrected for 3 tests) 
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Coupling of Implicit Situation Processing and Collective Emotions 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, implicit situation processing captures those cognitive 
processes that are focused on understating the situation while being exhibited in an implicit 
mode. Unlike explicit situation processing which involves reciprocal interactions between team 
members about the situation at hand, implicit mode of situation processing entails initiating a 
one-way flow of information about the situation that is either offered to the team without request 
or gathered from the task environment without any explicit instruction (see Figure 2). Following 
a similar procedure used for the coupling of explicit situation processing and collective emotions, 
I investigated the co-occurrence of implicit situation processing with collective emotions. The 
contingency tables associated with the coupling of implicit situation processing and the arousal 
dimension of collective emotions were found to lack homogeneity across both higher and lower 
performers (for higher performers, 𝐺2(18) = 44.27,  p < .01; for lower performer, 𝐺2(18) =
36.19,  p < .01). Therefore, higher- and lower-performing teams were not compared in terms of 
the co-occurrence of this cognitive process category and collective emotional arousal. With 
respect to the coupling of implicit situation processing and collective emotional valence, lag 
sequential analysis revealed that the co-occurrence of implicit situation processing and collective 
neutral emotion was significantly below chance in higher-performing teams, as opposed to 
lower-performing teams (for higher performers, ADRJ = -2.85, p < .01; for lower performers, 
ADRJ = -.35, p =.73). Moreover, the coupling of implicit situation processing and dispersed 
emotional displays was significantly below chance in lower-performing teams, as opposed to 
higher-performing teams (for higher performers, ADRJ = -.36, p =.72; for lower performers, 
ADRJ = -3.34, p < .001). The respective adjusted residuals are shown in Table 7.  
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Table 7.  
Adjusted residuals for the coupling of implicit situation processing and collective emotions  
 
 
Cognitive process:  
Implicit situation processing 
 
Co-occurring collective emotion  
Positive 
valence 
Neutral 
valence 
Negative 
valence 
Dispersed 
emotions 
Higher-performing teams 3.71 -2.85** 0.6 -0.36 
Lower-performing teams 2.87 -0.35 -0.07 -3.34** 
 
Note: Results based on 10 higher performing teams and 10 lower-performing teams  
** p < .012 (Bonferroni-corrected for 4 tests) 
 
 
Coupling of Explicit Action Processing and Collective Emotions 
Explicit action processing, as defined in Chapter 2, captures those cognitive processes 
that are focused on decisions/actions while being enacted in an explicit mode. This cognitive 
process category occurs when team members engage in reciprocal interactions to, for example, 
distribute tasks among themselves, ask questions about a current decision/action, speak up to 
challenge or correct a decision/action, or make plans for future decisions/actions (see Figure 2). I 
expected to find explicit action processing, like other cognitive process categories, to co-occur 
with a certain collective emotion to be able to differentiate higher- from lower-performing teams. 
To examine this expectation, I employed a similar procedure used for the above-mentioned two 
cognitive process categories and began with testing the homogeneity of the two contingency 
tables generated for teams. Results showed that the contingency tables associated with the co-
occurrence of explicit action processing and the arousal dimension of collective emotions lacked 
homogeneity across lower-performing teams (𝐺2(18) = 30.38,  p < .05). Similarly, the 
contingency tables associated with the co-occurrence of explicit action processing and the 
valence dimension of collective emotions were found to be nonhomogeneous across higher-
performing teams (𝐺2(27) = 56.85,  p < .01). Such a lack of homogeneity entails that the 
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coupling of explicit action processing with dimensions of collective emotion did not always have 
a similar pattern within each performance cluster, preventing me from pooling the contingency 
tables for subsequent lag sequential analysis. In order to be able to compare higher- and lower-
performing teams in terms of the co-occurrence of explicit action processing and collective 
emotions, further research is needed to thoroughly investigate the cause of this nonhomogeneity. 
Perhaps teams should be re-clustered based on both team performance and the factor causing 
some of them to display distinct coupling patterns. 
 
Coupling of Implicit Action Processing and Collective Emotions 
As previously stated in Chapter 2, implicit action processing captures those cognitive 
processes that are focused on decisions/actions while being enacted in an implicit mode. It 
essentially involves initiating a one-way flow of information about a current decision/action 
which could be in the form of offering unsolicited comments about a current decision/action, 
collecting information about the performance of other team members without any explicit 
instruction, or offering assistance to a teammate without prior request (see Figure 2). Following a 
similar procedure used for other three cognitive process categories, I investigated the co-
occurrence of implicit action processing with the arousal and also with the valence dimensions of 
collective emotions. With respect to the co-occurrence of implicit action processing and 
collective emotional valence, lag sequential analysis revealed no significant global coupling 
association in both higher-performing and lower-performing teams (for higher-performers, 
𝜒2(3) = 1.73, p = .63; for lower-performers, 𝜒2(3) = 3.11, p = .38). This could indicate that the 
exhibition of implicit action processing was not naturally associated with collective emotional 
valence. However, because in all pooled contingency tables associated with both performance 
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clusters, there was at least one cell with expected value of less than five, this result could not be 
taken as conclusive (see Chapter 3 for more details about the guidelines for lag sequential 
analysis). The co-occurrence of implicit action processing and collective emotional arousal was 
also examined (see Table 8). Lag sequential analysis showed that the coupling of implicit action 
processing and collective midaroused emotion was significantly above chance in lower-
performing teams, as opposed to higher-performing ones (for higher performers, ADRJ = 1.12,   
p = .26; for lower performers, ADRJ = 2.87, p < .01).  
 
Table 8.  
Adjusted residuals for the coupling of implicit action processing and collective emotions  
 
Cognitive process: 
Implicit action processing 
 
Co-occurring collective emotion 
High  
arousal 
Medium 
arousal 
Dispersed 
emotions 
Higher-performing teams^ -0.65 1.12 -1.1 
Lower-performing teams -2.19 2.87* -1.59 
 
Note: Results based on 10 higher performing teams and 10 lower-performing 
teams  
^ Global coupling association was nonsignificant for higher performers 
(𝜒2(2) =  1.91, 𝑝 =  .39) 
* p < .016 (Bonferroni-corrected for 3 tests) 
 
 
 
Figure 7 summarizes all the above-mentioned results concerning the co-occurrence of 
each of the four cognitive process categories with collective emotions. 
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Figure 7. Micro-temporal coupling associations between cognitive process categories and collective 
emotions that distinguished higher- from lower-performing teams 
Coupling = cognitive process × collective emotion 
Minus sign (-) denotes negative coupling association 
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Macro-temporal Dynamics 
My second research question focused on the macro-temporal dynamics of the coupling 
between team cognitive processes and collective emotions throughout a crisis event. Using 
GridWare, I examined two macro-temporal characteristics of the trajectory of the couplings over 
time: structure and content. Accordingly, I conducted whole-grid analysis to examine whether 
and how higher- and lower-performing teams could be distinguished based on the structure of 
their coupling trajectory during the crisis. Attractor analysis was also performed to compare 
higher- and lower-performing teams in terms of the content of their coupling trajectory.  
 
Whole-grid Analysis of the Structure of Coupling Trajectories 
As explained in Chapter 3, two whole-grid measures of structure were obtained from 
GridWare for each team’s coupling trajectory: dispersion and transitions per minute. These two 
structural measures capture the overall variability of a coupling trajectory. Dispersion reflects the 
range or spread of observed couplings during the crisis while transitions per minute represent the 
frequency of shifts between couplings within that range. I used these two measures to compare 
higher-performing and lower-performing teams in terms of the variability of their coupling 
trajectory. Because of the small sample size, I performed the Mann-Whitney U test as a 
nonparametric alternative to the independent sample t-test. Separate Mann-Whitney U tests were 
conducted on each measure of variability. These tests revealed no difference in dispersion and 
transitions per minute between higher and lower performers (see Table 9). Both higher-
performing and lower-performing teams exhibited a broad range of couplings between cognitive 
processes and collective emotions during the crises (for higher performers, 𝑀Dispersion= .919, 
𝑆𝐷Dispersion= .02; for lower performers, 𝑀Dispersion= .922, 𝑆𝐷Dispersion= .03, U = 58.5, p = .53). 
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Moreover, while higher--performing teams shifted in and out of different couplings at a slightly 
lower rate than lower-performing teams, these rates of transitions were not significantly different 
(for higher performers, 𝑀Transitions per minute= 8.14, 𝑆𝐷Transitions per minute= 1.27; for lower 
performers, 𝑀Transitions per minute= 8.41, 𝑆𝐷Transitions per minute= 1.38, U = 57, p = .63).  
 
Table 9.  
Descriptive statistics and comparisons of whole-grid measures of structure between higher- and lower-
performing teams 
 
 Higher  Lower 
U 
 
p 
  
M SD  M SD 
Whole-Grid Measures of Structure:        
Dispersion .919 .024  .922 .032 58.5 .53 
Transitions per minute 8.144 1.266  8.409 1.377 57 .63 
 
Note: Results based on 10 higher performing teams and 10 lower-performing teams 
U = Mann-Whitney U 
* p < .05 
 
 
 
Attractor Analysis for the Content of Coupling Trajectories 
Macro-temporal dynamics of the coupling trajectory of higher- and lower-performing 
teams could also be compared in terms of the location and the strength of their attractor. As 
defined in Chapter 3, an attractor is one or more cells (i.e., couplings) on the grid that pulls the 
trajectory from entering other cells across the grid. The coupling trajectory essentially tends to 
move towards its attractor cell(s). Accordingly, I employed Lewis and colleagues’ (1999) two-
step process to identify and quantify the strength of attractor cell(s) in each team’s coupling 
trajectory (see Chapter 3 for more details). In the first step, I performed a winnowing procedure 
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to specify the location of attractor cell(s) on each grid (see Table 10). The second step was taken 
to further ascertain that the identified attractor cell(s) was significantly stronger than other cells 
on the grid (in terms of pulling the trajectory). Accordingly, the measure of return visits was 
obtained from GridWare to operationalize strength and the attractor cell (or the lowest-duration 
attractor cell in case of a multicell attractor) was compared with the nonattractor cell on the same 
grid in terms of their return visits (Table 10). The Shapiro-Wilk Test indicated that the 
distribution of the return visits associated with the nonattractor cell deviated significantly from 
the normal distribution (p = .01). Therefore, I performed Wilcoxon-signed-rank test as a 
nonparametric test equivalent to the paired sample t-test. Results showed that return visits 
associated with identified attractors were significantly lower than return visits associated with 
their corresponding nonattractors (for attractors, M = 3.1, SD = .85; for nonattractors, M = 3.83, 
SD = .81, Z = -2.94, p = .003). Given lower return visits indicate a stronger pull, identified 
attractors were thus found to be significantly stronger than the nonattractor cell and, by 
extension, every other cell on the same grid (Lewis et al., 1999). 
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Table 10.  
Location and return visits of identified attractors and their corresponding nonattractors  
 
 Attractor  Nonattractor 
 Cell(s) Return Visits  Cell Return Visits 
Team 01 ExAct-MidNut, Residual-MidNut 2.75  ExSit-MidNut 5.62 
Team 02 ExAct-MidNut, ImSit-MidNut 1  ExAct-ArsNut 4 
Team 03 ExAct-MidNut 2  Residual-MidNut 4 
Team 04 
ExAct-MidNut, ExAct-ArsNut, 
ImSit-MidNut 
1  ExAct-ArsPos 5.67 
Team 05 ExAct-MidNut 3  Residual-MidNut 3.58 
Team 06 ExAct-MidNut 2  ExAct-ArsNut 3.25 
Team 07 ExAct-MidNut, ExAct-ArsNut 2  ImSit-MidNut 4 
Team 08 ExAct-MidNut 3  Residual-MidNut 3 
Team 09 ExAct-ArsNut, Residual-ArsNut 2  ImSit-ArsNut 3.35 
Team 10 ExAct-MidNut 3  ExAct-ArsNut 3.75 
Team 11 ExAct-MidNut, Residual-MidNut 3  ExAct-ArsNut 4.41 
Team 12 ExAct-MidNut 2  Residual-MidNut 3 
Team 13 ExAct-MidNut 2  ImSit-MidNut 3 
Team 14 ExAct-MidNut 3.78  ImSit-MidNut 3 
Team 15 ExAct-MidNut 3.58  ImSit-MidNut 3.53 
Team 16 
ExAct-MidNut, ExAct-ArsNut, 
Residual-MidNut 
2  ImSit-MidNut 4 
Team 17 
ExAct-MidNut, ExAct-ArsNut, 
Residual-ArsNut, ImSit-MidNut 
2  ExSit-ArsNut 4.8 
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Table 10. (continued) 
 
 Attractor  Nonattractor 
 Cell(s) Return Visits  Cell Return Visits 
Team 18 
ExAct-MidNut, Residual-MidNut, 
ImSit-MidNut 
3  Residual-ArsNut 4.25 
Team 19 ExAct-MidNut 2.78  ImSit-MidNut 3 
Team 20 ExAct-ArsNut 2  Residual-ArsNut 3.47 
 
Note:  
ExSit = Explicit situation processing 
ImSit = Implicit situation processing 
ExAct = Explicit action processing 
 
ArsPos = Aroused-Positive 
ArsNut = Aroused-Neutral 
MidNut = Midaroused-Neutral 
 
 
 
Next, I explored the potential differences between higher- and lower-performing teams in 
terms of the location and strength of their attractor. I began by visually inspecting the GridWare 
coupling trajectory of each team for potential differences. Visual comparison of attractor 
locations suggested that the coupling trajectory of higher-performing teams was more likely to 
have a single-cell attractor while the coupling trajectory of lower-performing teams tended to 
contain a multicell attractor (Figure 8). In order to verify this observation, I statistically 
compared the coupling trajectories of higher- and lower-performing teams in terms of the 
proportion of single-cell and multicell attractors. Accordingly, I created a 2×2 contingency table 
by crossing performance cluster (higher versus lower) with attractor size (single-cell versus 
multicell). Because some of the expected values for this contingency table were less than 5, I 
conducted the more conservative Fisher’s exact test as a nonparametric alternative to the 𝜒2 test 
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of independence. Results of the Fisher’s exact test confirmed that performance cluster would be 
marginally significantly associated with attractor size (p = .07). In other words, the coupling 
trajectory of higher-performing teams was found to be more likely to fall into a single-cell 
attractor whereas the coupling trajectory of lower-performing teams tended to get drawn toward 
a multicell attractor. I also compared higher- and lower-performing teams in terms of attractor 
strength. Using the measure of return visits to represent attractor strength (Table 10), I performed 
the Mann-Whitney U test and found no significant difference in return visits between higher- and 
lower-performing teams (for higher performers, M = 2.51, SD = .86; for lower performers, M = 
2.28, SD = .65, U = 41.5, p = .53), indicating that higher-performing and lower-performing teams 
did not differ in terms of their attractor strength. 
Combining the results of the above two tests revealed that while the attractor in both 
performance clusters pulled the coupling trajectory with the same strength, such strength was 
concentrated in a single attractor cell for higher performers whereas it tended to be distributed 
among multiple attractor cells for lower performers. In other words, higher-performing teams 
were more likely to become absorbed in one attracting coupling of cognitive processes and 
collective emotions where their trajectory would rest over extended periods of time and to which 
it would return very quickly. The trajectory of couplings in lower-performing teams, however, 
tended to get drawn toward a more diverse set of weaker attracting couplings which entailed that 
the trajectory would remain in each attracting coupling for a relatively shorter time and would 
not return to it very quickly.  
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Figure 8. Attractor cell(s), highlighted on the grids, in the coupling trajectory of a higher-performing 
team (left) and a lower-performing team (right) 
 
In addition to comparing higher- and lower-performing teams in terms of the number of 
attracting couplings, I also looked at the content of these attracting couplings in each 
performance cluster. The single, strong attracting coupling that pulled the trajectory of higher-
performing teams was the coupling between explicit action processing and midaroused-neutral 
collective emotions. This coupling also emerged as one of the several attracting couplings in the 
trajectory of the majority of lower-performing teams. No other attracting coupling was found to 
be as highly shared among the trajectories of lower-performing teams. In fact, the composition of 
attractors in the trajectory of each lower-performing team was so distinct that no two lower-
performing teams were found to get drawn toward the same set of attracting couplings. While the 
coupling trajectory of both higher- and lower-performing teams had tendency to settle in the 
coupling of explicit action processing and midaroused-neutral collective emotions, the strength 
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of this attracting coupling was significantly higher (i.e., lower return visits) in higher-performing 
teams than lower-performing ones (for higher performers, M = 2.81, SD = .64; for lower 
performers, M = 3.32, SD = .69, U = 61.5, p = .05). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
Organizations commonly use teams to rapidly and appropriately respond to crises. These 
teams must face a multidimensional challenge because crises not only present sets of ill-defined, 
complex problems, but also exert high emotional demands on the team. As a result, effective 
team functioning in crisis events involves handling each dimension of the crisis through distinct, 
yet concurrent, types of responses, namely team cognitive processes and collective emotions. 
Studies of crisis events to date, however, have largely examined cognition and emotion in 
isolation from one another. As a result, we know little about how team cognitive processes and 
collective emotions interact to produce a more (versus less) effective cognitive-emotional 
response to the crisis. The purpose of this dissertation was to address this question. More 
specifically, I aimed to investigate whether and how higher- and lower-performing teams differ 
in terms of the temporal dynamics of the coupling between team cognitive processes and 
collective emotions. In order to provide a more in-depth understanding of these dynamics, I 
conducted my investigation at both micro-temporal and macro-temporal scales. 
Accordingly, I used a longitudinal research design and behavioural observation methods 
to collect data from 20 MBA student teams dealing with a simulated organizational crisis. 
Taking an exploratory approach, I examined how the coupling between cognitive processes and 
collective emotions characterized higher versus lower performance in these teams. Team 
cognitive processes were captured along four main categories which Kolbe and colleagues 
(2013) suggested as most relevant to team functioning during a crisis. These four categories 
were: explicit situation processing, implicit situation processing, explicit action processing, and 
implicit action processing. Collective emotions were coded using a seven-category framework to 
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capture a high degree of variation in team-level affective states during a crisis. These seven 
categories were: aroused-positive, aroused-neutral, aroused-negative, midaroused-positive, 
midaroused-neutral, midaroused-negative, and dispersed. 
 
Micro-temporal Dynamics 
In order to answer my first research question regarding the micro-temporal dynamics of 
the coupling between team cognitive processes and collective emotions during a crisis event, I 
performed a series of lag sequential analyses and identified those co-occurrences of team 
cognitive process categories and collective emotion categories that were statistically meaningful 
in higher- versus lower-performing teams dealing with a crisis event. Adjusted residuals were 
calculated and tested to indicate significant coupling associations in each performance cluster. 
Significant adjusted residuals could take either a positive or a negative value, indicating a 
positive or a negative coupling association, respectively. In the context of my research, 
significant positive associations would indicate those couplings between team cognitive 
processes and collective emotions that occurred significantly above chance. Significant negative 
associations would suggest that the coupling occurred significantly below chance.  
 
Coupling of Explicit Situation Processing and Collective Emotions 
Lag sequential analyses showed that higher-performing teams differed from lower-
performing teams in what emotion they were less likely to express during the exhibition of 
explicit situation processing. More specifically, the probability of explicit situation processing 
co-occurring with midaroused collective emotion was significantly below chance in higher- 
versus lower-performing teams (see Table 6). As explained in my review of literature on team 
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cognitive processes, explicit situation processing can be considered a main element of collective 
sensemaking (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). Some previous research on the role of emotional 
arousal in sensemaking during crises suggested that a medium-level emotional arousal would be 
associated with more adaptive sensemaking during a crisis, compared with a high level of 
emotional arousal (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Maitlis, Vogus, & Lawrence, 2013). This is 
because midaroused sensemaking tends to consume less cognitive resources and allows greater 
openness to and more in-depth consideration of situational cues (Bazerman et al., 1998; Harmon-
Jones, Gable, & Price, 2011, 2013). Similarly, the greatest probability of vigilant information 
processing has been shown to occur at medium levels of emotional arousal (Elsbach & Barr, 
1999; Lazarus, 1991). Although my result seems to stand in contrast to these findings from past 
research, I argue that my work can actually extend and add nuances to them in an important way: 
While previous research has established the constructive role of midaroused emotions during 
sensemaking at the individual level, my research suggests that such a coupling does not 
necessarily characterize more effective sensemaking at the team level. My analyses showed that 
higher-performing teams did not need to collectively express medium levels of emotional arousal 
during explicit situation processing of a crisis event. Perhaps, only those team members directly 
involved in explicit situation processing would need to remain emotionally midaroused and the 
lower the probability of the rest of the team joining them in expressing midaroused emotions 
during the exhibition of explicit situation processing, the higher the team performance. There is 
some preliminary support for this conjecture in my data as lag sequential analysis revealed that 
explicit situation processing naturally tended to occur in an emotionally-dispersed team 
atmosphere, regardless of team performance (for higher performers, ADRJ = 2.62, p =.01; for 
lower performers, ADRJ = 3.17, p <.01). However, given my coded data did not include any 
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information about team members’ individual-level display of emotions during explicit situation 
processing, testing and confirming this conjecture is beyond the scope of the present study and 
needs further empirical research. 
 
Coupling of Implicit Situation Processing and Collective Emotions 
Lag sequential analyses revealed that higher-performing teams were significantly less 
likely than lower-performing teams to engage in implicit situation processing in an emotionally-
neutral team atmosphere (see Table 7). Unlike explicit situation processing which is embedded in 
reciprocal interactions between team members, implicit situation processing involves initiating a 
one-way flow of information that is either offered to the team without request or gathered from 
the task environment without any explicit instruction. Central to the notion of implicit situation 
processing is, thus, a powerful sense of commitment to helping one’s team update its 
sensemaking and enhancing the teammates’ understanding of the situation at hand. In this way, 
implicit situation processing can be characterized as a prosocial behaviour (Bolino & Grant, 
2016; Gagné, 2009; Wang & Noe, 2010). Defined as those behaviours undertaken with the 
intention of benefiting an individual, group, or organization (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986), 
prosocial behaviours encompass a range of different ways through which organizational 
members contribute to their team or their organization (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Bolino & 
Grant, 2016). Past research has established a significant association between positive collective 
emotions and the likelihood of prosocial behaviours in the team (Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015). 
The logic behind this emotional connection to prosocial behaviours is that shared positive 
feelings signal the pervasiveness of affiliative and cooperative tendencies within the team 
(Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005) and indicate a high level of social integration (Barsade & 
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Gibson, 1998). In such a socially integrated atmosphere, team members are more likely to 
exhibit commitment to their team’s task through enacting prosocial behaviours (Beal, Cohen, 
Burke, & McLendon, 2003, Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015). My result can add nuances to these 
overall findings by emphasizing that it is emotional non-neutrality, rather than a specific 
emotional valence, at the team level that determines the effectiveness of a prosocial behaviour 
such as implicit situation processing in teams facing a crisis event. Compared with valenced 
collective emotions, neutral collective emotion has been linked to lower creativity and less 
effective sensemaking due to greater social distance and lower psychological safety that it 
creates among team members (Parke & Seo, 2017). My analyses suggest that the dysfunctional 
role of neutral collective emotions in teams dealing with a crisis event would be most likely 
pronounced when team members are engaged in implicit situation processing. One possible 
explanation for this finding may pertain to the effect of emotional neutrality on team members’ 
perception of and reaction to the exhibition of implicit situation processing in their team. Lack of 
emotional valence in team atmosphere during a member’s exhibition of implicit situation 
processing may render the knowledge contribution of that member less psychologically 
meaningful to others and discourage the team from taking this input very seriously (Harvey, 
2014). As a result, team members may fail to appropriately use this information to enhance their 
understanding of the situation, which may ultimately lead to generating a less effective response 
to the problem at hand.  
The present research revealed another significant difference between higher- and lower-
performing teams with respect to the coupling of implicit situation processing and collective 
emotions. Compared with higher-performing teams, my analyses suggested, lower-performing 
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teams were less likely to engage in implicit situation processing during the time that members’ 
emotions were dispersed (see Table 7). In other words, lower-performing teams had more 
tendency than higher-performing teams to implicit situation processing in an emotionally-
homogeneous team atmosphere. On the one hand, as discussed earlier, implicit situation 
processing can be considered as a type of prosocial behaviour. Past research has shown that 
prosocial behaviours are likely to take place when team members demonstrate a high level of 
group bonding and social integration (Beal et al., 2003, Knight & Eisenkraft, 2015). One the 
other hand, a number of research studies have suggested that emotional homogeneity in a team 
and social integration among team members may be reciprocally related, with both constructs 
positively influencing each other (Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; Spoor & Kelly, 2004; Walter & 
Bruch, 2008). Integrating these two findings from previous research suggests that a prosocial 
behaviour such as implicit situation processing would be likely to naturally occur in an 
emotionally-homogeneous team atmosphere. This leads us to expect to find the co-occurrence of 
implicit situation processing and emotional homogeneity in both higher- and lower-performing 
teams. However, that the significant coupling association between implicit situation processing 
and emotional homogeneity only appeared in lower-performing teams suggests that implicit 
situation processing may not create a natural coupling with emotional homogeneity during a 
crisis event. While members of lower-performing teams were less likely to engage in implicit 
situation processing when emotions were dispersed, members of higher-performing teams did 
not necessarily wait for team atmosphere to become emotionally homogeneous before making 
unsolicited knowledge contributions during the crisis. Rather, they would sometimes go out of 
their way to help their team update its sensemaking even when the team has a less favourable 
atmosphere for the exhibition of implicit situation processing. Compared with lower-performing 
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teams, higher performers thus seemed more committed to enhancing team situation awareness 
during the crisis and less concerned about the emotional homogeneity of their team’s atmosphere 
during their exhibition of a prosocial behaviour such as implicit situation processing.  
 
Coupling of Implicit Action Processing and Collective Emotions 
Implicit action processing was found to co-occur with midaroused collective emotion 
significantly above chance in lower-performing teams, as opposed to higher-performing ones 
(see Table 8). In other words, lower-performing teams were more likely to enact implicit action 
processing in an emotionally-midaroused team atmosphere. As previously described in Chapters 
2 and 3, implicit action processing takes place when team members offer unsolicited comments 
to their team about a current decision/action, monitor the actions of other team members without 
any explicit instruction, or provide another teammate with unsolicited feedback or assistance. In 
order to effectively enact implicit action processing, team members often need to pay close 
attention to the actions and needs of their teammates, move or lean toward others to be able to 
check their performance, or speak in a relatively loud voice to get the attention of the entire team 
about a current decision/action (Marks et al., 2001; Rico et al., 2008). This suggests that team 
members typically exhibit a high level of emotional arousal while engaging in implicit action 
processing. Emotional arousal at the team level, however, seems to be less important than 
individual-level emotional arousal in generating more effective implicit action processing during 
the crisis (as indicated by nonsignificant global coupling association for higher performers; see 
Table 8). Rather, it is the characteristic of lower-performing teams to enact implicit action 
processing at a certain level of collective emotional arousal – namely, at a medium level. 
Frequent occurrences of implicit action processing in a midaroused team atmosphere could imply 
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that team members are often midaroused themselves when engaging in implicit action 
processing. Consequently, their level of mental and physical effort (e.g., attention, body 
movement, tone of voice) would only be high enough to detect and address a more restricted 
range of action-focused needs in their team, compared with a highly aroused emotional state. 
This may negatively impact the potency of implicit action processing in the team during the 
crisis.  
 
Macro-temporal Dynamics 
My first research question was focused on identifying the micro-temporal co-occurrences 
of cognitive processes and collective emotions that could discriminate higher- from lower-
performing teams dealing with a crisis event. Given the dynamic character of both cognitive 
processes and collective emotions, their co-occurrences or couplings was expected to be dynamic 
as well, changing along a trajectory over time. My second research question, thus, focused on the 
trajectory of couplings and asked which characteristics of this trajectory could differentiate 
higher- from lower-performing teams. I used GridWare to trace the unfolding of these couplings 
over the timespan of the crisis event within each performance cluster. GridWare not only 
visualizes the coupling trajectory but also provides quantitative measures that characterize the 
underlying structure and the content of this trajectory. In this way, GridWare enables taking a 
more holistic view and searching for meaningful macro-temporal patterns that were not obvious 
by merely looking at the coded data or even at the contingency tables derived from lag sequential 
analysis (Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; Magnusson, 2000; 2004).  
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Structure of Coupling Trajectories 
The overall structure of the trajectory of the couplings, which was plotted on a two-
dimensional grid in GridWare, was examined based on two measures: dispersion and transitions 
per minute. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, these two measures capture different aspects 
of the overall variability of a coupling trajectory (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2016). Whole-grid 
analyses found no significant difference between the coupling trajectory of higher- and lower-
performing teams in terms of dispersion and transitions per minute (see Table 9). In other words, 
higher performers’ trajectory of cognitive-emotional responses to the crisis was not found to be 
any more or less variable than that of lower performers. Previous research has suggested that 
higher team effectiveness in dealing with unexpected, rapidly-changing situations requires a 
wider repertoire of behavioural responses and a broader capacity to flexibly switch from one 
behavioural response to another (e.g., Burke et al. 2006; Cooke et al., 2013; Ellis & Pearsall, 
2011; Lei, Waller, Hagen, & Kaplan, 2016; Waller & Uitdewilligen, 2013). When variations in 
behavioural responses matches the changing dynamics of the situation at hand, the team would 
be equipped to switch to the most appropriate response in a timely manner (Ancona & Waller, 
2007; Gorman, Cooke, & Amazeen, 2010; Kelly & McGrath, 1985). My analyses showed, 
however, that behavioural responses in higher-performing teams did not need to demonstrate 
higher variability over very short timescales. This could be because moment-to-moment 
fluctuations in behavioural responses often occurred at a faster rate than changes in situational 
demands (e.g., change of crisis type, new demands from stakeholders during an organizational 
crisis). Adapting to the dynamics of those situational demands, thus, did not seem to depend on 
higher moment-to-moment variability in the trajectory of behavioural responses. 
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Content of Coupling Trajectories 
Although the overall variability of the trajectory of couplings between cognitive 
processes and collective emotions could not differentiate higher from lower team performance 
during a crisis event, my analyses revealed that the configuration of the attractors across the grid 
was a significant discriminating factor. More specifically, the coupling trajectory of higher-
performing teams was more likely to become absorbed in a single, strong, attracting coupling, as 
opposed to the coupling trajectory of lower-performing teams which tended to get drawn toward 
multiple, weaker, attracting couplings. A coupling becomes an attractor when it “pulls” the 
trajectory from entering other possible couplings. As previously described in Chapter 3, an 
attractor has two main characteristics: 1) it has a higher probability of recurrence than other 
couplings, and 2) it has shorter return latency than other couplings. Attractors seem to resemble 
the notion of interaction patterns, defined as regular sequences of behaviour, both verbal and 
nonverbal, that team members exhibit during task performance (LePine, 2003; Zellmer-Bruhn, 
Waller, & Ancona, 2004). However, whereas interaction patterns consist of recurring strings of 
behaviour that make for a consistent and orderly behavioural trajectory, attractors are not only 
recurring but also absorbing behaviours that prevent the trajectory from settling in other 
behaviours. These two constructs, thus, configure the team’s behavioural trajectory in two 
distinct manners. Fewer interaction patterns suggest more ability to shed consistent sequences of 
behaviours and more flexibility to exhibit new isolated behaviours, as has been found in higher-
performing teams (Stachowski et al., 2009; Zijlstra, Waller, & Phillips, 2012). Fewer attractors, 
on the other hand, indicate that the team has more tendency to settle in a small number of 
behaviours and exhibits less flexibility to spend equal time in many other potential behaviours, 
which my research found to be the case in higher-performing teams. Taken together, higher team 
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performance seems to entail displaying more flexibility in one aspect of the team’s behavioural 
trajectory and, at the same time, less flexibility in another aspect. Given the focus of research on 
interaction patterns has been on patterns of team cognitive processes and the focus of my work 
was on the coupling of team cognitive processes and collective emotions, these two findings 
cannot be integrated in a more specific manner. A more in-depth understanding of how attractors 
and interaction patterns can differentially configure the temporal pattern of higher- versus lower-
performing teams facing a crisis event requires performing attractor analysis on the temporal 
trajectory of team cognitive processes or using pattern detection methods on the couplings of 
cognitive processes and collective emotions, depending on the focus of the research.  
Going beyond the number of attracting couplings, I also looked at the content of these 
attracting couplings in each performance cluster. The single, strong attracting coupling that 
pulled the trajectory of higher-performing teams was the coupling between explicit action 
processing and midaroused-neutral collective emotions. This coupling also emerged as one of the 
several attracting couplings in the trajectory of the majority of lower-performing teams. While 
the coupling trajectory of both higher- and lower-performing teams had tendency to settle in the 
coupling of explicit action processing and midaroused-neutral collective emotions, higher-
performing teams were more strongly drawn toward this attracting coupling than lower-
performing teams, as suggested by my attractor analysis. Given attractor strength reflects the pull 
that the attractor has on the coupling trajectory and is determined by the number of return visits 
or latency to return to the coupling, this result indicates that there were shorter time intervals 
between successive pulls of the attracting coupling in higher-performing teams. In other words, 
these teams tended to return to exhibiting this coupling more quickly throughout the crisis event, 
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compared with lower-performing teams.  
Explicit action processing includes reciprocal interactions between team members about 
the team’s decisions or members’ actions that aims at generating the best solution to the problem 
and facilitating action coordination (Kolbe et al., 2013). Every time team members engage in 
explicit action processing, their team has a chance to discuss and update their decisions/actions 
on the basis of their latest understanding of the situation at hand. During ambiguous, rapidly-
changing situations such as crises, team members need to keep returning to discussing and 
updating their decisions/actions as more information becomes available and they learn more 
about the root cause of the problem. Explicit action processing, particularly when exhibited 
consecutively, has been found to be more or less effective depending on the team’s emotional 
atmosphere (Kauffeld & Meyers, 2009; Lehmann-Willenbrock et al., 2011). Those action-
focused discussions that occur in an aroused-positive atmosphere are facilitative, engaging, and 
constructive, thus enhancing team effectiveness. Aroused-negative discussions about 
decisions/actions, on the other hand, often take the form of complaining, seeking others to blame, 
or counterproductive arguments, thus wasting precious meeting time and leading to development 
of poor solutions (Kauffeld & Lehmann-Willenbrock, 2012). These findings, however, are 
derived from research on regular team meetings and may not be totally applicable to team 
functioning during crisis situations. As described in Chapter 1, crises are, by definition, hugely 
consequential to organizational members and communities in terms of losses and damage, and, at 
the same time, occur with very little response time available. Unlike in a regular team meeting, 
crisis management teams have to be both meticulous and quick in weighing their options and 
searching for alternative solutions to avert the risk of facing severe consequences. A highly-
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aroused team atmosphere may be too distracting and swallow too much cognitive resources for 
such a thorough and, at the same time, quick review of response options (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 
2010). In a positively-valenced team atmosphere, team members are more likely to assess the 
solutions they have already generated as satisfactory and, thus, less likely to exert as much effort 
as before in revising their decisions and actions (George & Zhou 2002; Knight, 2015). This may 
reduce their ability (or motivation) to critically review and quickly update their response in the 
light of new developments in the crisis situation, which eventually leads to generation of a less 
effective response. Negatively-valenced discussions might reverse the undesirable function of 
positively-valenced discussions, but simultaneously reduce the quality of interactions among 
team members, as previous research has suggested (Kauffeld & Meyers, 2009; Lehmann-
Willenbrock et al., 2011). Overall, medium levels of arousal and neutral valence seem to 
characterize the most beneficial emotional atmosphere for discussing and updating the team’s 
response to the crisis in a meticulous and quick manner. This might explain the higher propensity 
in higher-performing teams to continually return to the coupling of explicit action processing and 
midaroused-neutral collective emotions throughout the crisis.   
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The present research contributes to two different literatures. First, this study extends the 
crisis management literature by exploring how more (versus less) effective crisis management 
teams simultaneously respond to the cognitive and emotional aspects of an organizational crisis. 
Prominent frameworks for crisis management depict an organizational crisis as a cognitively 
complex and emotional event which requires a combination of cognitive and emotional 
responses from the organization (e.g., Hannah et al., 2009; James et al., 2011; Pearson & Clair, 
1998; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Yet, these frameworks mostly fall short of clearly identifying 
how these two types of responses combine to characterize more (versus less) team effectiveness 
during an organizational crisis. Moreover, team-level emotional responses to a crisis situation 
have generally been less explored than team cognitive responses, with the highest attention 
having been allocated to positive and negative team-level emotions and almost no scholarly 
attention to other categories of team-level emotions (e.g., emotional neutrality, emotional arousal 
and dispersed emotions). In the same vein, previous work has mostly examined the effectiveness 
of the coupling of team cognitive responses with valenced emotions at the team level, while the 
possibility of coupling team cognitive responses with other team-level emotions has remained 
largely under-explored. By using coding schemes that captured a broad and comprehensive range 
of team-level emotions, I was able to demonstrate that compared with more-studied, valenced 
emotions at the team level, under-explored categories of team-level emotions could more often 
determine whether a certain team cognitive process was more or less effective when the team 
was dealing with a crisis. More specifically, the coupling of team-level midaroused emotions 
with explicit situation processing and with implicit action processing could distinguish higher-
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performing crisis management teams from lower-performing ones. Also, the coupling of implicit 
situation processing with dispersed emotions and with team-level neutral emotions separated 
higher from lower team effectiveness during the crisis. Finally, the coupling of explicit action 
processing and midaroused-neutral emotions at the team level was found to more strongly pull 
the trajectory of higher- than lower-performing crisis management teams. Although often treated 
as separate, emotion and cognition have been conceptualized as intricately and inseparably 
linked (Ashkanasy, Humphrey, & Huy, 2017; Forgas, 2008). The current research explored this 
link at the team level of analysis and demonstrated how it could characterize more (versus less) 
effective crisis management.  
Second, the present research responds to calls for more dynamism in the study of teams 
(e.g., Cronin, Weingart, & Todorova, 2011; Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; McGrath et 
al., 2000; Waller et al., 2016) by capturing the unfolding of team cognitive processes and 
collective emotions as they occurred in real time and examining the temporal dynamics of their 
co-occurrences over time. Although existing theoretical work often emphasizes the changing 
nature of both team cognitive processes and collective emotions and characterizes them as 
dynamically intertwined (e.g., Barsade & Knight, 2015; Marks et al., 2001; Walter & Bruch, 
2008), there has been a dearth of empirical research on how their interplay varies over time. We 
have also known very little about whether and how the temporal dynamics of such an interplay 
characterize higher (versus lower) team performance. My study is one of the first to address 
these research gaps by using behavioural observation methods and advanced techniques for 
quantifying the temporal dynamics of interplays (Bakeman & Quera, 2011; Hollenstein, 2013; 
Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; Waller & Kaplan, 2016). It is also one the few to focus on 
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the temporal dynamics of the co-occurrences of these two team-level constructs. I performed an 
in-depth analysis of co-occurrences by examining them at two different temporal scales. At the 
micro-temporal scale, I performed lag sequential analyses to determine which observed co-
occurrences of team cognitive processes and collective emotions were statistically meaningful in 
higher- versus lower-performing teams facing a crisis event. At the macro-temporal scale, I 
tracked the evolution of co-occurrences over time by means of an exploratory visualization tool 
called GridWare. GridWare enabled me to characterize and compare higher- and lower-
performing teams’ trajectories of co-occurrences in order to further our holistic understanding of 
how the features of the temporal unfolding of the co-occurrences underlie differences in team 
performance, particularly in teams dealing with a crisis. This analysis shares an emphasis on the 
impact of time and the timing of behaviours in teams with time-based theories of team activities 
and processes (e.g., Gersick, 1988, 1989; Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999; McGrath, 
1991; Marks et al., 2001) as well as empirical studies on macro-temporal team dynamics (e.g., 
Ancona & Waller, 2007; Okhuysen & Waller, 2002; Stachowski et al., 2009; Waller, 1999). At 
the same time, it extends previous work by introducing the concept of attractor and showing how 
it could provide new information about the behavioural trajectory of higher- versus lower-
performing teams. As previously discussed in Chapter 5, attractors are similar to interaction 
patterns in characterizing the consistency of the behavioural trajectory during task performance. 
However, the latter construct is based on conceptualizing consistency as recurrence while the 
former captures a different aspect of consistency, one that is based on both recurrence and short 
return latency. Attractors can also be distinguished from other macro-temporal factors such as 
midpoint transitions, episodic cycles and entrainment patterns. For example, while attractors 
indicate the team’s tendency to settle in a small number of behaviours that remain unchanging 
  
97 
 
during task performance, other macro-temporal factors are often used to capture the team’s 
tendency to shift from one behaviour to another during task performance and how attention to 
time influences this shift.  
The findings of my research also have implications for practice by shedding light on how 
team cognitive processes go hand in hand with collective emotions to characterize higher versus 
lower team performance during the crisis. First, patterns of behaviour are often extremely 
difficult to detect, especially for those involved in performing the task at hand (Lehmann-
Willenbrock & Allen, 2017; Lei et al., 2015; Magnusson, 2000; 2004). Such patterns may be 
even more difficult to discern in real time when they encompass the mutual occurrence of two 
behavioural constructs, as opposed to the occurrence of a single behaviour. A systematic 
behavioural analysis is needed to identify these patterns and inform practitioners about which 
patterns enhance (or diminish) team performance. The present study conducted such analysis on 
teams dealing with a crisis event and its results can help crisis management teams take advantage 
of behavioural patterns to generate a more effective response to the crisis. For example, my 
research found explicit situation processing and implicit action processing to be less effective 
when exhibited in a midaroused team atmosphere. Leaders and members of crisis management 
teams should, thus, avoid the emergence of these two couplings when their team is dealing with a 
crisis. More specifically, they need to immediately display highly aroused emotions as soon as a 
team member (including they themselves) begins to engage in either of these two cognitive 
processes. They can accomplish this by simply starting to speak in a louder voice, use excessive 
hand gestures, or poise for action. My study also identified the coupling of implicit situation 
processing and neutral collective emotion as less effective. This finding suggests that leaders and 
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members of crisis management teams should avoid the emergence of neutral emotional 
atmosphere during the exhibition of implicit situation processing. Given implicit situation 
processing can be characterized as a prosocial behaviour and past research has established a 
strong link between positive collective emotions and prosocial behaviours (Knight & Eisenkraft, 
2015), it is recommended that crisis management team leaders and members engage in positive 
emotional expressions as soon as the exhibition of implicit situation processing begins in their 
team. They may, for example, smile, crack a joke, tease another teammate in a good-natured 
way, or simply nod in agreement. 
Second, the results can be incorporated into the training of students as well as 
practitioners to enhance their team-level behavioural capabilities for crisis management. More 
specifically, practitioners and students could receive training on how to increase the 
effectiveness of each cognitive process by maintaining (or avoiding) a certain emotional 
atmosphere in their team during the exhibition of that cognitive process. Emphasis could also be 
put on the importance of frequently returning to discussing and updating decisions/actions in a 
midaroused-neutral emotional atmosphere. Crisis simulations can provide practitioners and 
students with opportunities to practice these behavioural capabilities in a team setting and 
become more competent in exhibiting more effective couplings while avoiding less effective 
ones during future crises. Moreover, during debriefings or after-action reviews, trainees could be 
encouraged to reflect on their team’s coupling exhibitions and discuss new ways to ensure an 
appropriate emotional atmosphere prevails in their team during the occurrence of a certain 
cognitive process. For example, team members can try to enact each cognitive process with the 
appropriate emotional tone and make sure their teammates notice their tone in order to increase 
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the likelihood of emotional contagion within their team (Barsade, 2002). Each cognitive process 
carries a certain “emotional tone” depending on how it is worded and which nonverbal displays 
accompany it. Implicit situation processing with a positive emotional tone, for instance, may 
contain positively-valenced words, humour, assent, or nonverbal displays such as smiling or 
nodding. The emotion embedded in the exhibition of each cognitive process can be transferred to 
other team members through affective sharing processes such as mimicry and synchrony, 
resulting in emotional contagion (Kauffeld & Meyers, 2009; Lehmann-Willenbrock et al., 2011). 
This way, an appropriate collective emotion may emerge and prevail as team members engage in 
a certain cognitive process.  
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study had several limitations which suggest directions for future research. First, 
although my exploratory approach helped me surface an under-theorized phenomenon (i.e., 
coupling of cognitive processes and collective emotions during crisis) and uncover poorly-
understood dynamics associated with this phenomenon, the findings should be regarded as 
provisional and open to revision (Bamberger & Ang, 2016; Behfar & Okhuysen, 2018). In 
making a first step toward providing insight into how the coupling of cognitive processes and 
collective emotions characterize more (versus less) effective teams during the crisis, this research 
offers empirically-grounded “first suggestions” when previous research did not yield any clear 
predictions (Bamberger, 2018). Future research can treat the results of the present study as 
testable propositions and subject them to validation. It would also be important to investigate 
why certain couplings are more (or less) effective during the crisis. As an initial step, those 
possible explanations presented for each result can be empirically examined and verified.  
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Second, my research is based on a relatively small sample size of 20 teams. The small 
sample size reduced the statistical power of some of my analyses. However, I used a 
considerably rich data (i.e., about 21-minute video recording) for each team. In addition, and 
congruent with calls for more focus on “actual behaviours” and behavioural patterns in real time 
(as opposed to retrospective perceptions of behaviour) in groups and organizations (e.g., 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2017), I used fine-grained 
behavioural coding to capture my focal constructs, which produced a total of 5,629 behavioural 
events as input to my analyses. Moreover, research that examines relatively few teams in deep 
detail to develop an understanding of an under-explored phenomenon is not uncommon (e.g., 
Gersick, 1989; Stachowski et al., 2009; Waller, 1999; Weick, 1993; Zijlstra et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, the results of the present study should be considered as initial insights and further 
research is needed to replicate these findings using a larger sample size. 
Third, my findings are based on behavioural observations of teams dealing with a crisis 
in a simulated environment. Although other studies have also used simulation to examine team-
level behaviours (e.g., Christianson, 2017; Stachowski et al., 2009; Su et al., 2013; Tschan et al., 
2009; Waller, 1999; Zijlstra et al., 2012), questions may be raised regarding the external validity 
of the findings. Specifically, because participants were MBA students, they might not have 
enough motivation to perform as well in a simulated environment as they would in a professional 
organizational setting. However, as previously stated in Chapter 3, our video observations found 
no instance of students displaying an inactive or inattentive mode during the simulation so much 
so that my coders and I decided to remove the entire category of unaroused emotions from the 
coding scheme. This could indicate that students in this study were fairly engaged with the 
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simulation scenario. Moreover, students knew that their course grade would be influenced by 
their team performance in the crisis simulation. Therefore, they were very likely to perceive the 
simulated crisis as consequential.  
Another limitation with using simulations for studying crisis management teams concerns 
their duration. The crisis simulation in my research, for example, was not designed to walk the 
students through all possible stages of an organizational crisis. Rather, it covered the unfolding 
of the initial period of a crisis. Although this period is considered the peak of a crisis when the 
main characteristics of the crisis (i.e., unpredictability, time pressure, and uncertainty) are at their 
highest level, many crises would not be fully resolved by the end of this period. Crisis 
management teams may still need to deal with chronic problems that remain unresolved and 
ensure the organization is on its path to recovery (Kash & Darling, 1998; Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993). Therefore, the results of the present study might be associated with the short-term 
effectiveness of crisis management teams. In field situations, researchers will be able to track the 
performance of crisis management teams over a longer time span and examine how the temporal 
dynamics of the coupling between team cognitive processes and collective emotions during the 
initial period of the crisis characterize the long-term (as opposed to short-term) effectiveness of 
crisis management teams.  
With regard to other future research, it would also be beneficial to conduct a similar study 
in other contexts to shed light on the generalizability of the results obtained from the present 
research. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the primary focus of my research was on dual-
purpose action teams. However, it may be reasonable to assume that the cognitive and emotional 
dynamics of dual-purpose action teams differ from those of single-purpose action teams. Unlike 
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dual-purpose action teams, single-purpose action teams are specifically trained to manage crises 
and spend the majority of their time waiting for or responding to a crisis event (Waller & 
Uitdewilligen, 2013). These teams may, thus, develop a different (perhaps more confident) 
perception of the level of cognitive complexity and the intensity of emotional demands imposed 
by the crisis. Additional research should examine whether and how these dissimilarities change 
the way single-purpose action teams respond to the cognitive and emotional aspects of the crisis. 
Furthermore, the present findings are based on studying one type of organizational crisis (i.e., 
crisis of deception). The intensity of each main characteristic of the crisis (i.e., consequentiality, 
unpredictability, time pressure, and uncertainty) was also pre-specified and maintained at the 
same level during the simulated crisis. It would be worthwhile to investigate the research 
questions of this study in the context of other types of crisis (see Coombs, 2007 for a widely-
referenced typology of crises). Future research can also explore how variability in each main 
characteristic of the crisis, within or across crisis events, influences the effectiveness of the 
temporal dynamics of the interplay between cognitive processes and collective emotions.  
 
Conclusion 
As the old saying goes, into each life some rain must fall. Likewise, we might say, into 
each business some crisis must occur. Crises typically require team effort to handle an 
inextricable intertwinement of cognitive complexities with emotional demands. My research 
shows that the manner in which crisis management teams couple their response to the cognitive 
and emotional aspects of the crisis may significantly enhance (or undermine) their effectiveness. 
Moreover, crisis management teams need to be mindful of their coupling exhibition at both 
micro-temporal and macro-temporal scales. Overall, the present study suggests that rather than 
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examining the dynamics of cognitive processes and collective emotions separately, researchers 
should consider the coupling of both as possible simultaneous factors in distinguishing higher 
from lower team performance during the crisis.   
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APPENDIX A: CODING SCHEME FOR TEAM COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
 
 
Category Definition Description Example kappa 
Explicit situation processing .69 
Information request Coded if one team member 
directly asks another member or 
the whole team for information 
about the situation at hand 
- acquire task information addressing a 
particular team member or the room at large 
- ask questions about anything related to 
task (i.e., situation) 
- ask for input and relevant task-related 
information with an expectation for an 
overt reaction from other team members 
“John, what is going on with 
our stock price?” 
 
“Did anyone receive an email 
from the CEO?” 
 
Information evaluation Includes statements verifying  
information, questioning 
information, and providing 
summary about the situation at 
hand 
 
Evaluation between two people, 
no physical or verbal 
engagement from other 
members 
- make sense of information about the 
situation by explicit reasoning 
- discuss, summarize or interpret the state 
of affairs 
- express doubts or assurance regarding the 
accuracy or source of information (can be 
between two or more people) 
“That means we may lose our 
client.” 
 
“Are you sure DoD suspended 
our contract?” 
 
Information on request  Coded if a team member 
answers a task-relevant question 
asked  
by another member 
- supply information only in response to 
direct questions 
- answer direct questions about the situation 
at hand 
“Yes, they suspended our 
contract.” 
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Category Definition Description Example kappa 
Implicit situation processing .69 
Gathering information Coded if a team member 
actively  
gathers information from the  
environment (but not from the 
actions of other teammates) 
without being asked to do so 
- obtain unsolicited task-relevant  
Information 
- monitor the laptop, the cell phone, the 
memos and other documents looking for 
task-relevant information 
- track team resources and environmental 
conditions as they relate to the task at hand 
Reviewing the organization’s 
recent press releases 
 
 
 
Talking to the room 
(situation-focused) 
Coded if a team member 
addresses a communication not 
to a particular team member but 
to the room at large in order for 
the team to gain mutual 
understanding of the situation 
and problem 
- absence of eye contact with other  
members  
- speak relatively loudly 
- address to the entire team  
 
“We seem to have calmed the 
client for now.” 
 
Information without  
request 
Coded if a team member 
provides information to a 
particular teammate without 
being asked to do so 
- provide unsolicited task-relevant  
Information 
- proactively transfer information about the 
situation at hand 
- occurs when a team member anticipates 
that a teammate needs a  
piece of information and provides it without 
being asked to do so 
“A news reporter just 
contacted us and asked for 
comments on the DoD’s 
allegations.” 
 
Answering the question that is 
addressed to another team 
member  
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Category Definition Description Example kappa 
Explicit action processing .73 
Task distribution 
(giving instructions) 
Includes directives, commands, 
or assignment of subtasks 
- suggest/state a decision about what the 
team should do  
- give order or assign tasks to another 
member 
- task distribution, delegation  
- verbalizations of a past action addressed 
to a particular team member 
“I’ll write back to the reporter, 
you email our security team.” 
 
“We should write a short press 
release now.” 
 
Action-focused inquiry Coded when a team member 
asks questions to seek 
verification or clarification 
about a current decision/action, 
or requests feedback on one’s 
own actions 
- seek verification about a decision or task 
distribution 
- ask a question to make sure they are about 
to do the right thing 
- request feedback from other team 
members on one’s own actions 
“I’ll explain everything to the 
client, ok?” 
 
“Are you sending the email 
now?” 
 
Speaking up  Coded when a team member 
challenges a current 
decision/action, corrects the 
action of another team member, 
or provide feedback on the 
action of a particular team 
member 
- questions to express doubt concerning a 
current action or a previous task 
distribution 
- point out mistakes in decision/action and 
suggest correct course of action  
- give feedback to a particular team 
member in a positive/negative manner 
“Do we really want to ignore 
the reporter?” 
 
“No, you should take a softer 
tone with the client at this 
stage.” 
 
Planning Includes questions and 
discussions about the team’s 
action plan and verbalizations of 
non-immediate considerations  
regarding what should be done 
and when 
- evaluate options for decision/action as 
part of a back-and-forth discussion among 
team members (when the decision is made, 
it is coded as task distribution) 
- consider the consequences of an action on 
other actions or situational factors 
- prioritization, sequencing 
- present if-then scenarios 
“When we finish action A, we 
can start doing action B.” 
 
“We have to be careful with 
our action A because it has an 
impact on action B”. 
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Category Definition Description Example kappa 
Implicit action processing .55 
Team member 
monitoring 
Coded when a team member  
observes the actions of other 
team members  
- observe others’ work accomplishment to 
ensure that everything is running as  
expected  
- observe teammates to make certain that 
they are following procedures correctly 
Team member watches what 
another team member is doing  
 
Standing behind active team 
member, e.g. when they are 
typing their email 
 
Talking to the room  
(action-focused) 
Includes comments addressed to 
the room at large on the  
performance of own current 
behaviour or team-level 
performance, as well as brief 
indications of satisfaction with 
the team’s fulfilment of task 
 
- address the whole team, not a specific 
team member 
- absence of eye contact with other  
members  
- speak relatively loudly 
- verbalizations of own behaviour or 
personal need for something without 
addressing a particular team member 
 
“I am contacting the security 
team.” 
 
“I have already replied to 
Chris.” (addressed to the room 
at large) 
 
Providing assistance 
without request 
Coded when team members 
provided unsolicited help or 
anticipated an action being 
required for a smooth work 
process performed by another 
team member and took this 
action without being asked to do 
so 
 
- offer assistance (verbally or non-verbally) 
- anticipate another's need for help and 
offer them this help 
- fill in for someone else, help a teammate 
to correct a mistake, provide resources or 
supplies 
“Can I help you with this?” 
 
Although a particular team 
member is responsible for 
writing the press release, his or 
her teammate has already 
created a draft and passes it on 
to him or her.  
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Category Definition Description Example kappa 
Residual .62 
Acknowledgements Includes verbal statements or 
nonverbal expressions indicating 
one has heard or understood 
given information or instruction 
- repeat or paraphrase what one just heard 
from another team member 
- acknowledge that a message was received 
- request a message to be repeated 
- include statements of general agreements 
“Ok.” 
 
“No, please repeat.” 
 
“Fine.” 
 
“Sorry, what?” 
 
Also includes incomplete or inaudible sentences, 
 
Utterances that are irrelevant to the task hand, and 
 
Multiple cognitive processes occurring simultaneously 
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APPENDIX B: CODING SCHEME FOR DISPALYED EMOTIONS  
Emotion Category Behavioural Indicator Description 
Aroused-Positive Facial cues F: laugh or smile with teeth showing  
F: arched eyebrows  
F: a lot of eye contact 
 Vocal cues V: high pitch  
V: rapid pace  
V: loud volume  
V: animated intonation, rhythmic pattern 
 Postural cues  P: exaggerated hand gestures  
P: constant body movement  
P: orienting toward team members  
P: excessive nodding to show agreement  
 Verbal cues B: direct reference to the emotion category; example: 
“I feel excited”; “this is exciting!” 
Aroused-Neutral Facial cues F: a lot of eye contact  
F: open mouth  
F: arched eyebrows 
 Vocal cues V: rapid pace  
V: varied inflection  
V: incredulous tone 
 Postural cues  P: poised for action  
P: startled  
P: restless 
 Verbal cues B: talking over each other or interrupting one another 
Aroused-Negative Facial cues F: eyebrows lowered, chin raised, mouth closed  
F: flushed face  
F: tight jaws, clenched teeth 
F: vertical lines appear between eyebrows 
F: eye roll 
 Vocal cues V: stuttering  
V: short of breath  
V: uneven pitch (voice "cracks")  
V: uneven volume 
V: mocking or condescending laugh 
 Postural cues  P: closed fists, waving fists, hitting motions 
P: hand tremors  
P: poised for action  
P: involuntary twitches or jerks 
P: nervous habits (rocking, chewing fingernails) 
 Verbal cues B: direct reference to the emotion category; example: 
“This is disgusting”; “I feel anxious” 
B: sarcasm, mockery 
B: verbal cruelty, insults 
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Emotion Category Nonverbal Cues Description 
Midaroused-Positive Facial cues F: slightly raised eyebrows  
F: closed lip smile (grin), subtle laugh, chuckle 
F: eyes scan stimuli 
 Vocal cues V: varied inflection  
V: clearly audible volume 
V: shared subtle laughter between team members 
 Postural cues  P: hands are active during speech  
P: head tilted toward stimuli  
P: body poised to include team members 
P: nodding to show agreement  
 Verbal cues B: an explicit statement of an midaroused-positive 
emotion; example: “I am happy”; “This feels good” 
B: direct reference to sb/sth being funny 
B: joking or good-natured teasing of others relevant to 
the conversation 
Midaroused-Neutral Facial cues F: the face is neutral (resting face) 
F: be careful of wrinkles, pouches and bags that are 
permanent 
 Vocal cues V: even, relaxed voice  
V: within comfortable pitch range 
V: flat or monotone voice quality, but no trace of 
dejection, sternness or sullenness  
 Postural cues  P: torso is stable  
P: medium-level physical engagement with others or 
the task 
P: may have some small hand gestures 
 Verbal cues B: information exchange or question-response 
exchange without expressing any positive or negative 
emotion 
Midaroused-Negative Facial cues F: frown  
F: eyes avoid stimuli  
F: blank stare 
 Vocal cues V: average volume  
V: normal or fast pace  
V: monotone 
V: mumbling  
V: negative tone in utterance 
 Postural cues  P: head tilted downward  
P: resting head on hands  
P: body slightly poised for action or to exclude group 
members 
 Verbal cues B: an explicit statement of a midaroused-negative 
emotion; example: “I am frustrated”; “This is 
annoying”; “It feels sad”. 
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Emotion Category   
Dispersed Definition In a 4-member team, dispersed collective emotion occurs where 
the observer can identify two subgroups of 2-member, each of 
which is expressing a different emotional category. 
In a 5-member team, dispersed collective emotion occurs when 
the observer can identify two subgroups of either 2-member or 3-
member, each of which is expressing a distinct emotional 
category. 
Dispersed collective emotion can also occur when every single 
member of the team is expressing a different emotional category. 
 Cues When there is an isolated conversation within a subgroup of 
members and the rest of the team is not directly involved or does 
not pay attention to it, there is a good chance the team is 
experiencing dispersed emotions.  
See the decision flowchart for identifying team-level collective 
emotions (Appendix C) for more details. 
Note: 
Kappa values for categories of emotional valence and of emotional arousal are as follows: 
 
High arousal: .63  
Medium arousal: .62 
Positive valence: .62 
Neutral valence: .52 
Negative valence: .27 
Dispersed: .52 
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APPENDIX C: DECISION FLOWCHART FOR CODING COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS  
 
 
 
 
Note: This decisions flowchart is specifically developed for coding collective emotions in a 4-member or 
5-member team with a coding interval of 10 seconds 
